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ABSTRACT 
This paper takes a second look at the 2016 American Presidential Primaries from 
the perspective of asking what the American people were really after then they chose to 
ultimately support populism. Media reports and editorial discussions all pointed to a base 
that was somehow backing misogyny and racism. My research points to an alternative. 
Populism and social movement theory suggest that the success of anti-establishment 
candidacies is not credited to populists alone; in the case of 2016, it had support in the 
credibility and political opportunity left by social movements past. And so to investigate 
this historic battle between the establishment and anti-establishment candidacies, we can 
look to what populism and social movements have in common, and how they merge during 
the framing process. Within this context, this research seeks to answer how the anti-
establishment candidates of the 2016 American Primaries framed a battle against 'the 
establishment' – within an establishment arena and won. 
By seeing populism as more of a logic as opposed to an ideology, we can eliminate 
a partisan lens in the study of what happened in 2016. By seeing populism as a strategy 
when added to a collective action frame of a social movement, we can analyze how it was 
used to mobilize voters to action. By using populism and social movement theory, we can 
add further context to what voters were experiencing in 2016. This study uses a populist 
master frame analysis of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Primary debates, which ultimately 
illustrates the efficacy of populist messaging while exposing the weaknesses of the 
establishment rhetorical response. Findings suggest that populist candidates unearthed 
deep insecurities in 2016, specifically in areas concerning the economy, foreign policy, and 
within the identities affected by loss, discrimination and threats to human rights.  
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CHAPTER I.  INTRODUCTION 
The American presidential primaries of 2016 offered a milieu of electorate angst, 
anti-establishment candidacies, and populist showmanship with social movement 
characteristics, all culminating into one of the most exciting and politically contentious 
climates in modern U.S. history. Was it the clash of ideologies that stirred us so, or the 
strategies politicians chose to utilize during their campaigns? Or is it still the current state 
that our global politics finds us in?  
David Frum (Munk Debates, 2018) has referred to this period as a new populism. 
And although it had not yet been in the arena of such an aggressive globalism pitted so 
snugly against a requiem for the past, populism is not new. It has not changed – except that 
in 2016 America, populism has entered and won in the establishment arena. In an 
environment that first relished his outlier status and his verbose command of attention, 
Trump handily employed his unique brand of populism – as did the senator from Vermont, 
Bernie Sanders. 
At the time of this writing, populist-style contenders continue to enter the political 
arena. Andrew Wang promises a universal basic income. He frames it as a “freedom 
dividend” to help ward off the impending effects of artificial intelligence and automation 
(Bloom, 2018, p. 1). Bernie Sanders tags the word “Movement” at the end of his campaign 
videos in his 2020 bid to office, employing the same inequality messages of the past. 
Meanwhile Alexandria Ocasio Cortez, the youngest person to win a congressional seat in 
U.S. political history, handily won the 14th Congressional District in New York using some 
of the same Sanders’ rhetoric (Wallis-Wells, 2018). The popularity of all these candidacies 
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rests on their clearly stated intentions to buck old establishment ways. Their plans are called 
impractical – radical even.  
These are explosive, exciting times; not because of the ill-repute populism might 
leave in its wake, but because of the increasing saliency of politics and in watching how 
different populists wield its power. Populism by nature is disruptive, signifying the 
uncomfortable revelations of the greater problems that its mere presence has come to 
signify (Judis, 2016). As Judis writes, “Voters have suddenly become responsive to 
politicians or movements that raise issues that major parties have either downplayed or 
ignored” (Judis, 2016, p. 20). Neither populism nor social movements happen in a vacuum.  
This paper explores what happens when old contentions remain, as grievances and 
blame still stemming from the Great Recession, pour into the establishment arena under 
the powerful steering of populist candidacies. This newly-lit populism in the United States 
has divisively ignited the imaginations and activism of the American psyche in its media, 
and constituency of all ages. I explore this period through the lens of a populist master 
frame comparing findings to a similar frame analysis done on the populist social 
movements of the Great Recession. At its core, this particular case study investigates how 
the primary anti-establishment candidates framed a battle against 'the establishment' – 
within an establishment arena, for the right to lead the country on behalf of ‘the people.’  
A caution for anyone interested in improving the practice of politics, the findings 
herein illustrates how the complacency of establishment and ineffectiveness of social 
movements make ripe the opportunity for intervention of an alternate kind. More than 
anything, this paper unveils just how precarious the democratic system is to populism 
against the backdrop of changing superstructures. A growing economic insecurity and 
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inequality fused with a diminishing feeling of national security readied the conditions of 
the primary electoral arena in 2016; they were more cunning; they were wittier at the 
podium, and more than anything the populists of 2016 were more consistent in 
‘establishing’ what they wanted to set as the framing agenda. The anti-establishment 
candidacies of 2016 were bold and unapologetic; willing to name names while riding on 
the legitimacy of grievances set in social movements past.  
Organizational Overview 
I open this journey with a literature review that first dives into the context of the 
social movements of the Great Recession and the grievances it left behind. The electoral 
angst during the 2016 primary season, was illustrative of the continuation of grievances 
and increasing contention Americans were facing at the time. Once context has been 
established, I discuss the nexus between populism and social movement theory and how, 
at least in the case of the 2016 primaries, political opportunity and agency showed up in 
the form of populism when both establishment and social movements failed. And of course 
if we are to research how populists operated in 2016, we must also discuss what I mean by 
establishment versus anti-establishment candidacies, and the ‘establishment arena’ they 
play in. All of these are important factors that will be reconsidered within the discussion 
portion of the empirical findings in Chapter V. 
The empirical portion of this paper includes a populist master frame analysis of the 
2016 American presidential primary season [herein referred to as ‘primaries’], beginning 
from August 2015 to April 2016 followed by a further comparative analysis against a 
similar case study of the social movements of the Great Recession (see Methodology). This 
process will help illustrate how anti-establishment candidates used the populist master 
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frame in relation to the simple rhetoric of establishment candidacies. This analysis also 
works to reveal that those blamed for the grievances of the social movements of 2011 were 
the same in 2016. Herein I uncover how Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump drew on the 
experiential knowledge, fears and insecurities of a voter base – that in some ways served 
as either a new protest cycle of the 2011 Occupy movement.  
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CHAPTER II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
2008-2011: An Overview of a Contentions Past 
The slide into one of the greatest recessions on record began with a policy decision 
that failed to protect the people, a point of contention often brought up by Bernie Sanders 
during the 2016 primaries. The Glass-Steagall Act, a separation between commercial and 
investment banking, “had been repealed in 1999, and by 2007 income inequality in the 
United States had reached pre-1929 levels” (Kitromilides, 2012, p. 8). In 2008, the bottom 
fell out of America - as well as other parts of the world, jarring confidence everywhere. In 
the United States, it was a time when the repossession of homes, and personal economic 
insecurities were at an all-time high. To stress the magnitude of this crisis, I use the words 
of a scholar half a world away:  
A crisis that began in a small segment of the U.S. housing market evolved 
into a global credit crisis of systemic proportions. The impact of the crisis 
began to engulf households and business around the world. The most 
advanced economies (the U.S., the EU and Japan) were simultaneously in 
recession (Krinickiene, 2009, p. 124). 
These were the conditions that spawned the global social movements of the Great 
Recession, beginning in 2011 with the 15-M Anti-austerity Movement and the Los 
Indignados of Spain and Greece, followed by the Occupy Movement in the United States 
which extended to various cities throughout the world. In Spain the movement was a protest 
against the 41 percent youth unemployment rate, austerity measures, and “the predicted 
dominance of the main Spanish political parties in upcoming regional and municipal 
elections on 19 May” (Krinickiene, 2009, p. 4). Though he underestimated its impact, 
Spanish journalist Miguel-Anxo Murado captured the sentiment of the event when he 
wrote, “For all its far-reaching rhetoric, [the movement] … ultimately represents the 
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frustration of those who see that it doesn't matter which way you vote, the economic 
policies are dictated by the markets; hence the critique of the system” (quoted in Charnock 
et al., 2012, p. 5).  
Months later, on September 17th, 2011, fueled by similar sentiments to the 15-M, 
and the tactic of occupying public squares, the Occupy Movement began. Taking over 
Zuccotti Park, purposely in the Wall Street financial district of New York City, occupiers 
protested uncertainty, corruption, and inequality. Utilizing a populist master frame 
(discussed later in this paper), the leaderless movement strongly positioned itself in stark 
opposition to an elite antagonist. Some argued that the movement was a success as 
“evidenced by the diffuse reference in cultural and political discourse to the movement's 
framing of the 99% united against the corrupting influence of the 1% of elites who control 
the majority of global wealth” (Lubin, 2012, p. 185). These were the conditions under 
which the Occupy Movement was born: 
On the brink of collapse in 2008 and 2009, Wall Street firms were bailed 
out by the federal government while millions of Americans lost their jobs 
and homes. With a shrinking middle class, poverty reached an all-time high, 
and a record 50 million Americans went without health insurance… Adding 
to the frustration was the realization that the long-held American work ethic 
– work hard and get ahead – was no longer tenable (Lubin, 2012, p. 185). 
As Zuccotti Park cleared, however, the 1% was still intact, leaving the 99% 
somewhat unchanged while some fell even more behind. These were the conditions under 
which the 2016 American election season was born. 
A Discussion of Populism and Social Movement Theory 
What does populism even mean? In 2018, The Munk Debates questioned 
populism’s future as part of their deliberations, attracting both media and protesters to 
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Toronto's Roy Thompson Hall. Ex-Breitbart News executive and advisor to Trump, Steve 
Bannon, dubbed as “one of the world's most well-known populist thinkers and 
campaigners,” (Munk Debates, 2018) defined Trump's populism as an “economic 
nationalism” when he said to a somewhat mocking crowd: 
Trump's economic nationalism doesn't care about your race, your ethnicity 
or your colour… It cares if you're a citizen. We're at the beginning of a new 
political revolution and that is populism… is it going to be populist 
nationalism that believes in capitalism and deconstructing the 
administrative state and giving the little guy a piece of the action, and break 
up this crony capitalism of big corporations and big government? Or is it 
going to be Jeremy Corbin and Bernie Sanders type of populist socialism? 
(Munk Debates, November 2, 2018). 
Atlantic journalist, and former speechwriter to President George W. Bush, David 
Frum, offered this in response: 
[Populism] claims to speak for the people, but it always begins by 
subdividing the people and by saying some among the people, because of 
their skin or the way they pray, or their gender, whom they love or how they 
conduct themselves - or for some other reason. Populism begins by dividing 
the country between those people and us people and saying those people do 
not matter and our people do … this new populism, it's a scam, it's a lie, it's 
a fake (Munk Debates, November 2, 2018). 
In the greater public sphere, the defining moment for contemporary populism blurs 
further still. In October 2018, Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, tried to co-opt the ‘right 
type of populism,’ aligning himself with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: “I think 
Justin Trudeau and I are also populists. We are,” he says, “of [a] populism which is 
delivering for the people” (CBC News, October 25, 2018). This tendency of politicians to 
want to appear as an ally of ‘the people’ seems par for the course. In the loose proliferation 
of the term, Oliver and Rahn (2016) write that this is “why the populist label gets so widely 
applied” (p. 191). The difference, however, is not in the adoption of the term, but the 
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centrality of its practice. “[P]opulists do more than simply paint themselves on the side of 
the majority; they make populist rhetoric the center of their campaigns” (Oliver & Rahn, 
2016, p. 191).  
To Judis (2016) populism is seen as more of a logic with utility throughout the 
political spectrum, as opposed to its typical attribution as a right-wing-only ideology (p. 
14). Populism belongs to no one specific party, but rather employs a particular sensibility 
between leftwing and rightwing actors. According to Judis, leftwing populists work 
vertically, pitting the interests of ordinary masses in stark contrast to those in power. 
Rightwing populists will usually add a third party to the mix fighting those from above and 
below. This type of rightwing populist “champions the people against an elite that they 
accuse of coddling a third group, which can consist, for instance of immigrants, Islamists, 
or African American militants” (Judis, 2016, p. 14). Judas (2016) draws a further 
distinction on the right, however, between rightwing populism and “a conservativism that 
primarily identifies with the business classes against their critics and antagonists below” 
(p. 14). Regardless of ideological affiliation, “with the aid of the medium of mass 
mobilization” (Türk, 2018, p. 153), populism assumes at the very least, the existence of 
two rival groups; the disadvantaged (us) against the advantaged (them) elite. 
Aslanidis (2018) concurs. Populism belongs to no one ideology, but above mere 
logic, he sees it as a form of anti-establishment discourse in the name of the people – that 
when added to a collective action frame, becomes more of a strategic tool. In this sense, 
and within the context of social movement framing theory, Aslanidis views “populism as a 
mobilizing frame” (p. 444). His work identifies how populist framing was made manifest 
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during the social movements of the Great Recession, which I refer to later in the empirical 
portion of this paper. 
So the different schools of thought on populism are those that believe populism as 
belonging to a particular extreme version of ideology; as more of a benign cooptation of 
other politicians, as a form of economic nationalism; as a divisive scam, versus those that 
see it as logic or a strategic tool of mobilization. For the purposes of this research, I adopt 
the definition of populism similar to that of John Judis (2016) and Paris Aslanidis (2018), 
defining populism as both a logic as well as a strategic tool for the purpose of mass 
mobilization. 
Where Social Movements and Populism Converge 
The social movements of the Great Recession were effective in using populism as 
a mobilizing force by framing the 99% of a collective humanity against the 1% of a corrupt, 
billionaire class (Aslanidis, 2018). It built a consensus which manifested in colourful 
protests and the occupation of public spaces; an overt exercise of power. In terms of real 
change, however, the social movement fell short. The movement had no real access to the 
establishment process and lacked the enduring motivating power and leadership to change 
it. 
This case study relies heavily on the 2018 work of Paris Aslanidis for two reasons. 
First, the empirical methodology of this study was inspired by his 2018 analysis on the 
social movements of the Great Recession and their use of “populism as a collective action 
master frame” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 443). And second, for how he draws attention to the 
connection between mobilization, social movement theory and populism. He is one of the 
first scholars to argue that the “Great Recession mobilizations can be meaningfully 
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understood as a wave of populist social movements, instigated via the politicization of 
citizen identity” (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 301/302). And although some prefer not to use the 
terms “populist movements” and “populist social movements” interchangeably, Aslanidis 
(2016) points to the work of contemporary scholars who “conceptualize the American 
populists as both a social and a political movement… contending that ‘authentically 
populist social movements and parties have played important roles at critical times’ in 
American history” (p. 302). This then provides an opportunity to borrow the literature of 
social movements to help explain the populist attributes of the 2016 primaries. To Aslanidis 
(2016), there is a clear “relation between social movements and electoral politics [that] 
should serve an opportunity to bring social movements and populism theorists together” 
(p. 303). 
Although Aslanidis boldly marks an association between these two schools, he 
builds on the work of those before him who have drawn loose parallels between the social 
movements of the Great Recession, and populism. Judis (2016) writes that populist 
“campaigns and parties have converged in their concerns, and in the wake of the Great 
Recession, they have surged” (p. 13). Until recently, “there was no concerted effort toward 
building a comprehensive framework for the study of populist mobilization, despite its 
growing significance in the past decades” (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 301). I suspect that the 
current election cycle (2020) and the results of the last one (2016) may change that. Here, 
through the help of a scholar’s attempt to publicly explain populism, I will build an 
illustration of what populism and social movements have in common; how they merge 
during the framing process and how the greatest difference between them lies in the direct 
rhetorical leadership of the populist.  
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In September of 2016, scholar and writer, Niall Ferguson told an audience for 
Zeitgeist Minds that there are five ingredients needed for populism to emerge: an increase 
in immigration, increased inequality, a major financial crisis, the perception of corruption, 
and finally a demagogue (Ferguson, 2016, Time 2:31-5:40). Four of these five precursors 
also make up part of social movement theory. The bridge between populist-style social 
movements and populism lies in the strategies they have in common and the grievances 
people face. 
Just Immigration or Population Changes? 
A new Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965 saw “a flood of new immigrants, 
including unskilled labor from Latin America and Asia” (Judis, 2016, p. 44). With the 
influx of a plentiful, low-cost labor force, this new immigration policy had inadvertently 
aided in lowering wages while also impugning union powers (Judis, 2016). In addition to 
the consequences of conventional immigration laws, international conflicts exert further 
pressure on an already feeble system, like that of the Syrian refugee crisis. These pressures 
only further exasperate the growing disparity between parties; where Democrats want to 
open up borders, Republicans prefer a more selective, cautious approach. The reasons for 
caution have ties to national security in fears of terrorism, but also to that of a feeling of a 
potential loss in national identity. By 2050, North America “is projected to be a majority 
minority… replacing the self-confidence of white majorities with an existential insecurity 
channeled by the lightning rod of immigration” (Kaufman, 2019, p. 2). Ferguson’s 
necessary ingredient of immigration for populism, therefore, is valid but also highly 
limiting as it relates solely to a right-winged perspective of the term. And since we have by 
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now discovered that populism is non-partisan, I would, therefore, expand Ferguson’s 
confined ingredient of immigration to one of population change in general.  
Populations move not only internationally, but within nations as well; from rural 
areas to cities; from state to state; from cities to suburbia. People are always moving. They 
move from belonging to one demographic category to another as they age; their differences 
in political perspectives also change; and new cohorts are formed. Within these changes 
the opportunities to support these populations as they morph, also changes, and sometimes 
the opportunities fall short. Jack Goldstone's (2002) perspective on social movement theory 
supports the idea that changes of population can act as source of contention. There is not 
enough time and space to go through all of the possible factors affecting population 
changes, but as an example, let us expand on one demographic in the form of American 
youth. Goldstone (2002), for instance, posits that “[p]roblems arise when there is a 
persistent mismatch between employment prospects and the size and nature of the labor 
force” (p. 10). This may include reasons of immigration but does not have to.  
In the United States, a factor of political discontent for youthful Sanders' supporters, 
for instance, might be “over-education relative to the caliber of available jobs” (Goldstone, 
2002, p. 10), a grievance compounded by growing student loans. Experiences within 
demographic groups, like Mannheim’s political generation concept, are also a factor. 
Mannheim theorizes that “political generations emerge when particular birth cohorts are 
exposed to highly distinctive life experiences during adolescence or young adulthood” 
counting the “protest cycle among these distinctive life experiences” (Goldstone & 
McAdam, p. 195). The baby boomer generation, for instance, during their youth, for the 
first time through the American education system and their involvement in the protests of 
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the 1960s, drew the attention of media, movements, and businesses. It was a generation 
that enjoyed the luxury of economic advantage; one who was readily available for protest. 
As suggested by the Manheim theory, this 1960s youth cohort had “a strong sense of 
generational identity and ‘history-making’ potency… the capacity to act as a conscious 
political group” (Goldstone & McAdam, p. 211).  
Fast forward to 2016, you have a cohort of youth that remembers the Occupy 
Movement; a youth living in a world where some of the top American organizations are 
run by people close to their own age (Mark Zuckerberg is merely 34). They have the 
memory of a protest cycle, the advantage of organization through the education system, 
and a strong millennial identity. To add to the political generation concept, however, is the 
addition of the real grievance of the lack of economic advantage and security that past 
generations once had. This may only further fuel the ‘strong sense of generational identity 
and history making potency’ that Mannheim’s political generation concept describes. 
With respect to population changes and affects between rural and urban areas, some 
suggest that the 2008 recession may have affected rural and urban populations differently. 
This might help explain the rural/urban divide among supporters between primary 
candidacies. One study analyzing institutional confidence levels after the Great Recession 
found “that individuals who live in the counties that experienced the greatest economic 
shocks have larger declines in confidence in the federal government and organized labor 
than those living in other counties” (Danziger, 2013, p. 23). This variance in population 
experience between rural and urban areas can help explain the Republican / Democrat 
rivalry – where rural populations tend to support the Republican base and urban 
populations, the Democrats.  
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Growing Inequality, Corruption, and a Major Financial Crisis 
Just as is the case with social movements, Niall Ferguson gets it right when he 
points out how increased inequality, a major financial crisis, and the perception of 
corruption, work as ingredients for populism. Social movement theorists refer to these 
issues, generally, as grievances, which come in many forms and affect collective groups 
differently.  
The genesis of this research began with wanting to further explore the impact of 
lost work and identities stemming from the wake of the Great Recession of 2008 and what 
it meant for the politics of America. Though economic inequality started decades before, 
2008 and beyond was described as “the most severe recession since the Great Depression 
of the 1930s” (Danziger, 2013, p. 6). Real wages have since stagnated or actually 
decreased, greatly impacting the lower to middle class worker, making way for a renewed 
form of contentious politics in America. Bad trade deals, corruption and lobby influences 
were seen as part of the problem with an understandable “public skepticism… [in] 
opposition to American firms moving plants overseas” (Judis, 2016, p. 45). 
Social movement theory supports, at the very least, a conversation about the effects 
of structural changes and modernization on society, as a source of growing inequalities and 
potential crisis. In challenging the notion of whether or not modernization was a cause of 
contentious politics, Charles Tilly (1973) had cast aspersions on Samuel Huntington’s 
findings on the matter. Tilly cited Huntington’s lack of evidentiary support for “the effects 
of changes in the rate of social and economic modernization within the same country” (p. 
432) as a reason to disagree with his position. Huntington (1968) had accredited the 
contentious conflict between the years of 1958 and 1965, to “rapid social change and the 
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rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of 
political institutions” (p. 4). He goes on to explain that as innovations and modernization 
begins to take hold within a conventional society, some “sources of identity and 
association… may be undermined and destroyed... Others, however, may achieve a new 
consciousness and become the basis for new organization because they are capable” (p. 
38).  
Arthur Brooks, a social scientist and scholar, has been championing awareness of 
what he refers to as the dignity gap since 2014. By ‘dignity gap’ he means that parts of 
America have been suffering with the phenomenon of no longer being needed. The 
disappearance of jobs from the North American market, has changed the very nature and 
pay of work. He argues that past policies “got the U.S. government into the business of 
treating people left behind by economic change as liabilities to manage rather than as 
human assets to develop” (Brooks, 2017, p. 3). And while identities in some parts of the 
U.S. are being lost, others are being voiced in the form of Black Lives Matter, women’s 
rights, equal work for equal pay, etcetera. So there is not only a disparity in income 
equality; and equality of rights, but also a growing identity gap. Nevertheless, these gaps 
coincide with Huntington’s (1968) earlier idea of the lost and found identities in the wake 
of modernization processes. 
Indeed the issue of growing inequality has inspired new research into 
modernization and structural influence on greater society. One of the reasons the Great 
Recession was felt so widely around the world was due to the global market ties between 
industry and countries. This globalization made possible what is referred to as 
financialization whereby “during a period of hegemonic transition... capitalist elites 
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respond to increased international competition by shifting their investments from 
production to finance” (Van der Zwan, 2014, p. 104). In her study on the 
internationalization of global markets, Van der Zwan (2014) points to the disproportionate 
compensation between executives and employees, as executives are now more so rewarded 
on the basis of stock value as opposed to actual production output (p. 107).  
Not only are financial rewards disproportionately favouring managers and 
executives, but the research consensus is that these rewards are given at the expense of 
employees. It is as Van der Zwan (2014) writes, “a dramatic picture, in which the pursuit 
of shareholder value is directly linked to declining working conditions and rising social 
inequality for large segments of the population” (p. 109). Much in the same way that anti-
establishment candidacies accuse establishment of being influenced by lobbyists and 
superPAC funding, the new ‘financialization of global markets’ may be affecting corporate 
behaviours, as executives seek out ‘market performance’ enhancers as a path to higher 
compensation (p. 110). Van der Zwan (2014) cites “internationalization of global markets 
[as a] major impetus for firms to withdraw from productive activities” (p. 104), while also 
incentivizing offshore production.  
Under the guise of neo-globalization, other structural influences are also underfoot 
which will serve to challenge economic equality now and in the future. Automation and 
artificial intelligence are expected to fundamentally change entire industries. And while 
new jobs and opportunities will be created in its wake, “technological advancement has 
stagnated or even shrunk earnings for much of the population across nations” (Islam, 2018, 
p. 933). Still, to date, there is little evidence that establishment politics is preparing for the 
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impending repercussions. In this case, Huntington’s view of the modernization process and 
a slow-to-move establishment as cause of contention, becomes more and more relevant. 
Social movement theorist, Ted Gurr (1968) refers to fissures in equality as the 
culprits behind what he terms as ‘relative deprivation’ – a driver of contention. He describes 
this as “a state of mind that can he defined as a discrepancy between people’s expectations 
about the goods and conditions of life to which they are justifiably entitled, on the one 
hand, and on the other their value capabilities – what they perceive to be their chances for 
getting and keeping those goods and conditions” (Gurr, 1968, p. 51). Skocpol (1979) 
describes this as a condition that occurs when “a gap between the valued things and 
opportunities they feel entitled to and opportunities they actually get” (p. 9). The American 
dream used to be achievable – the loss of good-paying jobs, a growing inequality and 
shrinking middle class now have citizens believing otherwise. As stated by Lubin earlier 
regarding the Great Recession – “the long-held American work ethic – work hard and get 
ahead, was no longer tenable” (Lubin, 2012, p. 185). 
A Demagogue or Something Else? 
The fifth ingredient that Ferguson deems necessary for populism is the presence of 
a demagogue. But a demagogue and populist are not the same thing. It is no surprise, that 
like populism, demagoguery lacks consensus in definition. A term originally coined by the 
Greeks, the meaning of demagogue ranges from something as banal as being “a leader of 
the people” (Hogan & Williams, 2004, p. 152) to someone who makes “dangerous popular 
appeals” (Ceaser, 2007, p. 258). For others still, a demagogue is merely “a label used to 
discredit those who offend our rhetorical or ideological sensibilities” (Hogan & Williams, 
2004, p. 153). 
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Most of these definitional variations, however, might be fine for a Donald Trump, 
but would omit cases like Bernie Sanders. His rhetoric is not consistent with the pejorative 
connotation of a demagogue, yet his framing of speech and leadership style is indeed 
populist. Here is where Niall Ferguson and I disagree. And to help clarify my point, I refer 
to the work of Michael Federici. In The Challenge of Populism, Federici (1991) contrasts 
the ‘populist demagogue’ and their style of oratory to that of ‘the statesman.’ Quoting John 
Hallowell, he writes, “The statesman is concerned with inspiring right action, and the test 
of his statesmanship is his ability to lead public opinion rather than slavishly to follow it” 
(p. 120). He further clarifies his position by describing a true statesman as one who in their 
attempt to lead, “tries to persuade [the people] by means of argument” (p. 120). Whereas 
the demagogue, on the other hand, is more inclined to “publicly berate their opponents, 
using hyperbole to characterize their positions” (p. 120). In Sanders and Trump we can see 
the respective statesman and demagogue, but that does not preclude either from their use 
of populism. Rather than the presence of a demagogue, therefore, the fifth component of 
populism, could be seen as the actual populist – or agent who uses populism as a means to 
mobilize people to action.  
Ferguson is right in that grievances alone do not lead to populism (otherwise his 
list of five would be one), just as grievances alone are not enough to lead to the collective 
action within a social movement. Goldstone (2002) writes that “it is a profound and 
repeated finding that the mere facts of poverty and inequality or even increases in these 
conditions, do not lead to political or ethnic violence” (p. 8). Rather, in addition to 
grievances, “there must be some elite leadership to mobilize popular groups and to create 
linkages between them” (p. 8). Supporting Goldstone's point, McCarthy and Zald (1977) 
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add “issue entrepreneurs and organizations” to the list of acceptable elite leadership (p. 
1215) – a brief discussion on the agency of populist leadership is then warranted. 
Barr (2009) looks at the advent of populism by analyzing the “nature of political 
appeals, the individual's location vis-à-vis the party system and the linkages emphasized,” 
(p. 44). Through this lens, populism can be precisely defined as “a mass movement led by 
an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment 
appeals and plebiscitarian linkages” (Barr, 2009, p. 38). Note that these appeals do not have 
to be partisan; nor do they have to be denigrating in nature. 
Generally, linkages have to do with “the means by which political actors and 
constituents exchange support and influence” (Barr, 2009, p. 34). Plebiscitarian linkages 
(meaning direct vote) are associated with populism because there is an implication that in 
populism, a direct relationship exists between the populist and ‘the people.’ This direct 
relationship, however, is highly symbolic, that “although citizens feel like direct 
participants… they are expected to delegate power to a politician who claims to be the 
embodiment of their redemption” (Barr, 2009, p. 36).  
This anti-establishment, plebiscitarian, ‘go it alone’ maverick behavior of a populist 
– aligns with the sentiment that “establishment is not willing, or perhaps incapable of 
moving fast enough toward a solution to the perceived crisis” (Judis, 2016, p. 16) – and so 
something else is needed. The populist then becomes the leadership component and agency 
that social movements sometimes lack. But there is more to how and why populism showed 
up effectively in 2016. This is where I look to social movement theory to fill in what 
Ferguson has left out. 
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What Populist Assumptions Leave Out, Social Movement Theory Will Provide 
So far we have discussed all the conditions that Niall Ferguson says are needed in 
order for populism to exist. In the case of the 2016 American Primary season, and the 
surprising success that populism showed in the general election, there are a few additional 
considerations that come to mind. A further look into other theoretical positions of social 
movements could help explain how populism might not only exist but actually succeed. 
Political Opportunity, Even After the Movement Dies 
The failure of the social movements of the Great Recession does not mean that the 
grievances were not real nor that they still are not real. In this section I argue that if 
grievances are not dealt with by the establishment, in essence, if establishment fails, and 
even if ensuing social movements thereafter fail, that contentious politics will continue and 
create opportunity for something else to step in. In the case of 2016, that something else 
was populism. It is as Goldstone and Tilly (2001) write that “the repeated empirical finding 
[is] that in many situations, even after controlling for other factors, increased repression 
leads to increased protest mobilization and action” (p. 181).  
Political opportunity involves changes in the dynamics of a situation that somehow 
transform the expectations of what can be done (Tarrow, 2011, p. 163). When conditions 
change, new possibilities emerge; new material, new resources, new supports can be 
thought of; new discussions can be had about how people might do things differently. This 
means that although a social movement fizzles out, its work was not done in vein. The 
death of a movement and persistence of grievances can arguably create new political 
opportunity for the populist to come in and take up the work started in the movement 
before. In this sense a dead social movement, followed by a successful populist challenge 
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(in that the populist successfully activates people toward consensus and action – or even 
election!) can be seen as simply a new cycle of protest. It is as Tarrow (2011) writes: 
As conflict collapses and militants retire to lick their wounds, many of their 
advances are reversed, but they often leave behind incremental expansions 
in participation, changes in popular culture, and residual movement 
networks. Cycles of contention are a season for sowing, but reaping is often 
done during the periods of demobilization that follow, by late-comers to the 
cause, by elites, and by authorities (Tarrow, 2011, p. 266).  
Outside of the election process, establishment can still be challenged, but it leaves 
little room for ‘maverick’ antics, and opportunity then becomes on the side of establishment 
to appease grievances by other means. “If the state is in a position to negotiate and appease 
the social sectors where from these demands originate, then populist mobilization will not 
ensue” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 447). But in this case the state, or establishment had not 
reconciled in any real way with the movement concerns and because the movement came 
to a natural decline, they did not have to. An election cycle, however, presents new political 
opportunity for populists in that the establishment arena becomes officially open for 
business, and positions are formally up for challenge. Social movements do not have direct 
access to the electoral arena though some might try to affect its course anyway. 
With all the political opportunity left behind from the social movements of 2011, 
coupled with standing grievances and an open electoral arena to establishment, the 2016 
American elections made for a most opportune time for a populist agenda. Had the Occupy 
Movement succeeded, the reasoning to pursue a populist agenda would be mute. But in 
this case, by taking up the same unaddressed grievances, the populist borrows the 
credibility of the prior movement’s claims, already validated by its followers in the 99%: 
The majoritarian view of democracy implicitly provided legitimacy for the 
movement and its claims; at the same time, divisions among the 99 percent 
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were underplayed, since the vagueness of the collective identity allowed 
everybody to feel part of the in-group. The Statement of Autonomy 
proclaimed Occupy a people's movement (Aslandis, 2016, p. 311). 
Other political opportunity considerations include outside interferences at the 
macro level that may work to further induce mobilization (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 628). 
In 2011, the macro-level events in Greece, Spain, and the United States exposed 
commonalities between movements which created more impetus for others to join the 
cause. The social movements of the Great Recession uncovered a collective clash between 
neo-globalization efforts and the needs of people and their communities; an unearthing 
which served as fodder for new populist activity in America as well as Europe. 
Another element that perhaps made ripe the ascent of candidates like Donald Trump 
and Bernie Sanders is the normalization and possibly even a preference for a less formal, 
grassroots form of content creation. “These new forms of interactive digital media also 
shift the focus away from a transmission model of traditional news framing effects to a 
more interactive, social constructivist, and ‘bottom-up’ model of framing” (Nisbet, 2010, 
p. 75). In some ways, the informal, direct discourse made possible by social media has 
perhaps made clearer, the path for populism, and its practitioners, to take hold in times of 
contentious politics.  
Name it, Blame it, Change it. Framing in Populism and Social Movements 
We now know that political opportunity in the form of a new collective awareness 
and credibility of grievances, an openness to establishment through the electoral arena, and 
the greater normalization for populist-like discourse through social media, all helped the 
American populists of 2016. But what else? While all of these catalytic conditions were 
critical to the populist fates of the 2016 primaries, the season had one further special sense 
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of agency behind it. In addition to those mentioned above, political opportunity can also 
be affected by a mobilization of resources through the framing process itself. This occurs 
when “the framing of entire episodes of contention” can be seen as a “mechanism … in the 
immediate environment that triggers mobilization” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 163) by bringing 
bystanders and even converts into the process. This is exactly what the populist master 
frame was made for! 
I mentioned credibility earlier because its role is significant in the framing process 
that carried the populists of the day. The aftermath of the Occupy Movement gave the 
American populists of 2016 the credibility to name the corruption and grievances that 
remained unaddressed by establishment, despite the social upheavals of 2011. 
Establishment had not changed all that much and inequality had only since grown. One 
study done the same year as the primaries had shown that the middle class was in decline, 
nationwide, across American cities – “the share of adults living in middle-income 
households fell in 203 out of 229 U.S. metropolitan areas examined from 2000 to 2014” 
(Fry & Kochhar, 2016, p. 3). A falling middle class automatically widens the gap between 
the one percent elites and the rest of society (the 99 percent) that Sanders so frequently 
cites within his political rhetoric. When the middle falls out, only the ends remain. So the 
grievances of the 2011 social movements were not wrong. The populists knew it and were, 
therefore, easily able to tap into people’s ‘experiential knowledge’ (Goffman, 1974), 
adding more credibility to the populist frame. Therefore, this void that remained from the 
dust of the social movements of the Great Recession granted the opportunity for populism 
to move in. 
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I begin this next section by first providing a general definition and purpose of 
framing, followed by the meaning of a collective action frame and all of its working 
components. I then explore what it means to use populism as a collective action frame and 
how the collective action frame can extend to what is known as a master frame. 
The framing process is both a meaning-making and mobilization machine and yet, 
useless without a driver. A frame sets the structure for the needed identity work that aids a 
movement practitioner or populist in telling motivational stories about issues; how the issue 
came about and what needs to be done. A frame is defined as “a central organizing idea for 
making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (Kuypers, 2010, p. 300, 
also Gamson, 1989, p. 157). The process of framing is deliberative in defining and 
promoting certain information and ideas over others. Entman (1993) refers to this as a 
process of “selection and salience” (p. 52). Although not always perceived as intended, the 
salience of a well-constructed frame has the power of making some issues “more 
noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” over others by simply including some 
facts at the exclusion of others (p. 52-53). In the context of describing how media uses 
framing, Entman defines faming as “the process of culling a few elements of perceived 
reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a 
particular interpretation” (Entman, 2010, p. 336). In keeping with his definition of 
populism as strategy, Aslanidis (2018) defines frames as “discursive structures aiming to 
supply and make available versions of reality that cater to their producers’ strategic needs 
in the wider struggle for social meaning making” (p. 445). 
Benford and Snow (2000) have done an extensive amount of research on collective 
action frames, master frames and framing tasks. They describe framing as a means “to help 
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render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and 
guide action” (p. 614). This stems from Erving Goffman’s (1974) fixation on frames as 
“the organization of experience” (p. 11). But a framework, he writes “allows its user to 
locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences 
defined in its terms” (p. 21) even if subconsciously. And so the negotiation for meaning 
making begins with the framing process and the agency of the one who uses it.  
Collective action frames work as a structural tool to help movement practitioners 
(or populists) build consensus about an issue by first defining the problem at hand. Once 
defined, the framework then sets out to “make attributions regarding who or what is to 
blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to 
affect change” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615). Components of the collective action frame, 
as suggested by Gamson (1995) include “injustice, agency and identity” (p. 90). The 
injustice piece implies that the problem being identified is not merely a ‘wrong’ but a 
“moral indignation… laden with emotion” (p. 90). Emotions play a significant role in 
populist movement making, which I discuss later. The agency component suggests that 
desired changes are achievable if effected “through collective action” (p. 90). Lastly, the 
element of identity “refers to the process of defining this ‘we,’ typically in opposition to 
some ‘they’ who have different interests or values” (p. 90). But when added with the edge 
of populism, the identity component is most affected. 
The literature suggests that when used as a collective action frame, populism has 
the ability to cover all three components of ‘injustice, agency and identity.’ “As a collective 
action frame, populism is based on an anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign 
people, invoking the value of popular sovereignty to seek redress for injustices perpetrated 
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by unaccountable elites that have usurped political authority” (Aslandis, 2018, p. 447). The 
2018 Aslanidis study proposes that the social movements of 2011, including the Occupy 
Movement, used this form of collective action frame, where populism was used to mobilize 
‘the people’ to action (p. 443). This particular frame’s openness to other groups is what 
brings us to the concept of a master frame. 
Master frames are like collective action frames which broadens the framing process 
to include more than one issue or use devices to simplify blame. This opens the movement 
up in a way that can be as inclusive as possible to others. If successfully executed, the 
master frame “invites other groups to recognize its utility and potentially exploit it in 
mobilizing their own constituencies, profiting from the opening of a fresh discursive 
opportunity” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 445). “In this sense,” Aslanidis (2018) writes, “master 
frames differ from movement-specific collective action frames by informing a wide array 
of protest events, providing movement entrepreneurs with a generic rubric for blame 
attribution, amenable to customization and adaptation to particular needs and objectives” 
(p. 445). The rights framing of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s was a great example 
of a master frame that opened up for other movement entrepreneurs, like the women’s 
rights movement, LGBT and “gay rights, animal rights, abortion rights, fetal rights, and 
student rights” (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 4). The populist messaging executed in the 
Occupy master framing process, however, was one easily understood, and resonated around 
the world. “As the best slogans do, it concentrated the most basic issues into a phrase. That 
Wall Street represented the ‘1%’ was of course an implication, but the frame also brought 
a more general inequality into focus” (Calhoun, 2013, p. 33).  
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Framing Tasks and Devices 
The framing tasks as assigned by Benford and Snow (2000) help to organize the 
negotiation process toward the goal of mobilization by either moving people toward action 
or toward some sort of consensus on an issue. There are three framing tasks designed to 
achieve these initiatives: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. The diagnostic 
framing process is where grievances or the issue in need of change is defined while also 
ascribing blame. What to do about the grievance or issue is handled during the prognostic 
framing process. Lastly, inciting supporters to action becomes the job of the motivational 
frame. This is where “the elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes 
beyond the diagnosis and prognosis” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 202) and where reasoning 
and framing devices come into effect. 
Framing devices are simplified messages, mottos, slogans, or metaphors used to 
quickly amplify meaning within a frame. If well done, devices increase the memorability 
of a message, while also inviting buy-in and even participation in its repetition. “We are 
the 99%” for instance was a catchphrase termed by David Graeber an American anarchist 
activist (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 311). Hashtag ‘#OccupyWallStreet’ was first coined by Kalle 
Lasn, founder of Adbusters, through a blog and twitter post that actually brought people 
out to Zuccotti Park on September 17th, 2011. Per Lasn, “The whole idea behind Occupy 
Wall Street was that we, the people, would go to the iconic center of global capitalism, 
which is Wall Street, and we would take it over. It's a hell of a sexy idea, right?” 
(Middlewood, 2012, p. 32). The point was to motivate people to some action. Framing 
devices, the phraseology of motivating words and slogans is a tactic often used in 
advertising, their meaning and intent are direct. Reasoning devices on the other hand, are 
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more of an implication. They are much less obvious and work to “form a route of causal 
reasoning which may be evoked when an issue is associated with a particular frame” (Van 
Gorp, 2010, p. 91). In this case as the receiver is interpreting the framed message, the hope 
is that they will make a “causal inference … in line with the [intent of] the reasoning 
devices” (p. 91).  
These devices are particularly useful in motivating consensus or action, especially 
through the use of emotional triggers like fear or moral arguments. Within this context, the 
use of fear for instance, might come in the form of iterating the threat of something 
happening if something else is not done. Goldstone and Tilly (2001) consider threat as part 
of creating political opportunity. Here the idea is that despite being repressed and feeling 
the pressures of a system working against you, that the threat of something worse will be 
enough to mobilize people to action (p. 183).  
Are Framing Tasks Populist by Design? 
Populism, when taken apart, can be seen as employing the same framing logic as 
social movements. Populists may differ slightly in tactics, perhaps more so in actual 
rhetorical style between rightwing and leftwing populists. But generally in populism, there 
is a “vertical politics of the bottom and middle arrayed against the top” (Judis, 2016, p. 15). 
Earlier we read how David Frum talked of populism, calling it “a scam… that claims to 
speak for the people, but it always begins by subdividing the people” (Munk Debates, 
November 2, 2018). And yet if we look to the collective action framing in social movement 
theory, the mechanics of ‘identity juxtaposition’ are the same. By defining the grievance 
and the blame during the diagnostic phase of framing one “defines the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a 
movement’s structure of conflict and alliances” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 31).  
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Because frames are socially constructed, they require agency in the construction of 
meaning making (Benford & Snow, 2000). In the same way that “movement actors are 
viewed as signifying agents engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning” 
(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613), populists are also signifying agents. In the populist master 
frame deployed in 2016, the populist is the one naming the grievance, the one who calls 
the blame, and for the prognostic framing task, serves themselves up as being the direct-
to-people-solution. The populist becomes the agency in the “meaning making struggle” 
(Aslanidis, 2018, p. 444).  
More specifically, the motivational framing task, as seen through the populist's lens, 
is rhetorically designed as a means to move people to action. This task in social movements 
is referred to as “the agency component of collective action frames” (Benford & Snow, 
2000, p. 617). Here the populist puts to task their own social capital, their own language 
and style, which in turn gains further political opportunity through resource mobilization. 
One’s charismatic character, hyperbolic rhetoric and positioning in part determines a 
frame’s efficiency and effectiveness “to garner bystander support and to demobilize 
antagonists” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614).  
Aslanidis (2018) argues “that the inclusive identity of 'the people' and its 
contentious juxtaposition against sociopolitical and economic 'elites' allowed activists to 
mobilize diffuse sentiments in favor of the value of popular sovereignty and unite disparate 
grievances in society toward joint action” (p. 444). In doing so, he brings the worlds of 
populist rhetoric and the collective action frames of social movements together. If Aslanidis 
can use populist theory to help explain the social movements of the Great Recession, then 
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certainly, we can use the framing tasks of social movement theory to help explain the 
populism of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries.  
All definitions imply some sort of construction in terms of selection or the actual 
creation of a reality that works in favor of the framer’s interest. The idea behind frame 
analysis then is that if something is socially constructed, it should then be able to be 
deconstructed, studied and even counted. The purpose then of a frame analysis “is to 
reconstruct the underlying, culturally embedded frames in a text” (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 93). 
The term frame analysis was first coined by Erving Goffman in his 1974 writing of 
the same title. Goffman saw frames as a means of people making sense of and defining 
certain phenomenon – usually through exposure of specific events, and the subsequent 
conscious or subconscious organization of information. To him, “frame analysis is a slogan 
to refer to the examination … of the organization of experience” (Goffman, 1974, p. 11). 
Thanks to the work of Benford and Snow, this approach has since been pushed from 
“cognition … toward collective and organization processes appropriate to mobilization” 
(Johnston, 1995, p. 217). In other words the purpose of frames was to no longer merely 
organize experiences in order to make sense of something, but to move people toward 
action based on a frame’s resonance. If Goffman was the first one to consider frame 
analysis in the work of meaning making, then Benford and Snow were the 2.0 version of 
the same. 
Counter Frames 
It is important to note that those on the recipient end of blame, or those who disagree 
with a frame’s intent or context, do not simply remain docile in the process. Indeed there 
are those who reject and seek to challenge the frame, and in the process may come up with 
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their own. This oppositional response is known as counter-framing where there is a 
concerted effort to “rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths, versions 
of reality, or interpretive framework” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 626). Oppositional 
responses within the same movement or party are referred to as “framing disputes” or 
“framing contests” (p. 625-626). The very process then of framing itself, is therefore 
argumentative, which may only add to further complicate the already contentious politics 
it purports to fix (p. 614).  
I should note that while challengers or counter-frame actors can include anyone 
who disagrees with a frame, for the purposes of this research, due to the limited scope of 
this research design, the only possible counter frames that become part of the analysis, are 
those produced by the establishment candidacies within the 2016 primary debates. 
In Keeping with the Cycle of Protest 
Aslanidis cautions that in the interest of empirical integrity, when doing a master 
frame analysis, the context should be in keeping with the cycle of protest (Aslanidis, 2018, 
p. 446). If a cycle of protest is defined as “a phase of heightened conflict across the social 
system, with rapid diffusion of collective action … and sequences of intensified 
information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities” (Aslanidis, p. 446), 
then 2016 could perhaps qualify as a new cycle of protest of an old movement.  
This claim, however, would not be without its challengers. In 2013 for instance, 
Calhoun writes: “But for the most part there is relatively little reason to expect continuity 
in [Occupy Wall Street] as such… It will not be just ‘Occupy Again’ but something new, 
sparked by its own exciting innovations, giving voice to new participants and new visions” 
(Calhoun, 2013, p. 27). But branding something by a different name does not make it new. 
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Calhoun is right in that the 2016 cycle was not called Occupy, but its grievances remained; 
and its framing, at least by one populist, certainly maintained the use of the same Occupy 
slogans (see empirical portion). 
The Establishment Arena 
The establishment arena within the context and purposes of this research, represents 
the traditional political ‘primary’ process of choosing presidential candidates. It is referred 
to as the establishment, or more precisely, the electoral arena because there are traditional 
ways a politician comes to be a candidate in the primaries – including shared ways of 
campaign funding, the binary profession of Republican or Democrat ideology, and the 
declared support of their respective issues. Theodore Windt describes the ‘establishment 
arena’ well, defining it as “the arena of political reality within which political thought and 
action take place… [that] in the United States … presidents set the initial terms for 
argument about issues and politics. Their messages create the arenas in which others will 
do rhetorical and political battle” (Windt, 1990, p. 3). 
Participating within the electoral or establishment arena may have special rhetorical 
framing considerations as well. As suggested by McCarthy et al. (1996) an effective frame 
requires the rhetorical talents of the framer, especially when it pertains to breaking past the 
‘gatekeepers’ of the electoral arena – those charged with trying to protect against the entry 
of outsiders. Within this context, McCarthy informs us that “the discourse in different 
arenas may well require more elaborated plans and programs if they are to be convincing 
to gatekeepers… the rhetorical quality of frames is crucial to their success” (McCarthy, 
Smith, Zald, 1996, p. 311).  
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Establishment v. Anti-Establishment Candidacies 
The next concept that requires definition comes in two parts, the establishment 
versus the anti-establishment and their respective candidates. The 2016 American primary 
elections brought notoriety to the contrast in terms, where headlines gave credence to the 
notion that a counter-establishment movement was on the rise. Here are just a few headline 
examples: 
This campaign is a mortal threat to their grip on the establishment…We 
need to teach the Republican establishment a lesson… The Republican 
establishment is…determined to stop us... The Establishment Tries to Exert 
What Influence It Has Against Gingrich… (Serazio, 2016, p. 181). 
There is a consensus among the literature as to what constitutes an establishment 
candidate and/or party. But there is variance on what constitutes the anti-establishment. In 
first defining establishment party I defer to a study by Amir Abedi, who “measures 
establishment by the governing potential of a party and its actual governmental relevance” 
(Abedi, 2004, p. 11). For the purpose of this research, establishment (and/or establishment 
candidate) is defined as “first, all those parties that have participated in government or 
alternatively those parties that the governing parties regard as suitable partners for 
government formation, and second, parties that are willing to cooperate with the main 
governing parties by joining them in a coalition government” (Abedi, 2004, p. 11). 
To help define anti-establishment parties and persons, Abedi comes up with a three-
part criterion, whereby all parts must be true. An anti-establishment party, and for the 
purposes of this study, an-anti-establishment candidate, is: 
[a] party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and 
political system issues; [a] party that perceives itself as a challenger to the 
parties that make up the political establishment; [and finally, a] party that 
asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the political 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 34 
establishment and the people. It thereby implies that all establishment 
parties be they in government or in opposition are essentially the same 
(Abedi, 2004, p. 11). 
Robert Barr (2009) talks of the expression of anti-establishment sentiments as those 
which “claim that the power elite are unable or unwilling to represent ordinary citizens” 
(p. 31). In this sense, Anti-establishment candidates do not simply wish to replace the 
political elite, but to affect change in the entire system. In doing so they utilize “a specific 
rhetorical appeal…where political actors attempt to gain support through an ‘us versus 
them’ discourse” (Barr, 2009, p. 31). In this description, we can once again see the system 
of framing at work. 
In a viewpoint that differs from other scholars, Schedler (1996) writes, that “[a]nti-
political-establishment actors declare war on the political class” (p. 293). To him, anti-
establishment is less about outsiders going against establishment government, but more so 
about those aggressively opposing those who appear in control of the overall system in a 
way that controls and prevents the success of others. “Its main thrust has been anti-
capitalist, anti-oligarchic, or anti-imperialist. In sum, where anti-political-establishment 
actors carry populist banners, they do so in a qualified way; they engage in anti-political 
populism” (p. 293). For all the things that have generally been suggested of the anti-
establishment candidate, Schedler, nearly alone in his judgement, is right to caution us that 
“unless we always choose to take sides for the status quo, we must first assess the 
underlying empirical realities before we judge anti-political diagnoses of irrationality to be 
irrational themselves” (p. 297).  
In a more partisan view, Serazio (2016) makes the argument that it is primarily anti-
establishment actors that “strategically harness resentment against the unfair conditions of 
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contemporary privilege and power” (p. 188). To Serazio, where the left properly names 
their establishment foes, in the case of the Occupy Movement, “the villainous one percent,” 
the right, he points out, names no one really; that the enemy, rather, is somewhat imagined 
- the “boogeyman or party to that secret cabal… naturally [stopping] shy of such an outright 
confrontation”(p. 188).  
Why it All Matters 
Why should we care about populism? Because it appears to only show up when 
everything else has gone wrong. If establishment failed to listen when thousands upon 
thousands of people lined the streets and occupied public spaces in 2011 in cities around 
the world, what will they listen to? Maybe if the movements would have been more clear 
perhaps, but how much clearer can you get than a four-word slogan? The framing by the 
populists during 2016 not only served as a movement-maker, it actually served as a 
president-maker. But a frame is only as powerful as its audience is vulnerable to fear and 
hope. And so when the frame is working, it can only mean that times are that dire. People’s 
experiential knowledge deserves recognition. And they should not have to wait for some 
populist to put what they are feeling into words on their behalf. When establishment and 
social movements fail, people had better hope that the next best solution is on their side. 
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CHAPTER III.  ANALYSIS 
Scope of Analysis 
This research design entails the execution of a populist master frame analysis of the 
2016 American presidential debates, beginning from August 2015 to April 2016 (see 
Appendices B and C). This process illustrates how the populist master frame was used by 
anti-establishment candidates in relation to the simple rhetoric of establishment 
candidacies. Grievances of the social movements of the Great Recession (Appendix K) as 
well as results from a 2016 Pew Research report (Appendix I) are also considered.  
The Candidates 
For this study, the following will represent the anti-establishment candidates whose 
2016 debate rhetoric will undergo a frame analysis: Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, and 
Ted Cruz. Those designated as ‘establishment candidates’ within this research, for reasons 
of their families’ longevity within the establishment arena, as well as their own political 
record, are Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush. The latter two need no further explanation as to 
why they should represent ‘establishment’ candidacies. An explanation for the inclusion of 
Sanders, Trump, and Cruz is outlined below. 
Trump proves his position as an anti-establishment candidate for a number of 
reasons. His first bout in politics came on the tails of Ross Perot's run for the presidency in 
the mid-1990s, when he fought to lead the new Reform Party. Insecure about the party's 
future, and after dropping out of the race, Trump implies his anti-establishment status when 
saying, “he regretted not being able to run a race against Mr. Bush and Mr. Gore, two 
establishment politicians” (quoted in Judis, 2016, p. 72). When asked by a reporter from 
Bloomberg Businessweek about the future of the Republican party, Trump responded, 
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“Five, ten years from now - different party. You're going to have a worker's party. A party 
of people that haven't had a real wage increase in eighteen years, that are angry” (p. 77). 
These were not the thoughts of someone embedded in establishment ideals, even if he is 
solidly embedded as a member of the economic elite.  
Like Trump, Bernie Sanders' debut in politics lay outside the establishment. 
“Sanders ran for Senate twice and governor twice in the '70s on the ticket of the Liberty 
Union, a leftwing third party in Vermont” (Judis, 2016, p. 78). Having failed miserably in 
his bid for higher office, Sanders finally found success in municipal politics (Judis, 2016, 
p. 79). Municipal wins garnered Sanders the experience and name recognition that would 
later help propel him to the House of Representatives and eventually, the Senate – all the 
while remaining an independent candidate. Though he first self-identified as a “radical and 
socialist,” (Clendinen, 1982, p. L24), Sanders now describes himself a democratic-socialist 
(Weigel & Fahrenthold, 2015, p. 2). 
And lastly, because John Dickerson (2013) called him  “a populist egghead” (p. 1), 
I include Ted Cruz on my list of anti-establishment candidates. Having had roots (still 
present) in the populist Tea Party, Dickerson described Cruz’ entry to Washington as “an 
anti-establishment bolt from the blue, having defeated the GOP’s preferred nominee in his 
first Senate race” (p. 1). A lot has happened with Ted Cruz since 2013, namely, he fell short 
of winning the candidacy in 2016 perhaps because he was not anti-establishment enough; 
or perhaps his rhetorical skill could not stand in comparison to that of his challenger’s. For 
the purposes of this study, I maintain the use of Cruz as an anti-establishment candidate, 
precisely because his brand of populism failed: “despite his highly praised and far superior 
ground organization, Cruz was outperformed by Trump” (Mast, 2017, p. 467). 
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The following is a summary of the candidates whose rhetoric, during the 2016 
Primary debates, will be reviewed as part of this populist master frame analysis (see Figure 
1): 
Anti-Establishment Candidates 
Donald Trump 
Though non-establishment, 
Donald Trump comes from within 
the establishment and garners 
enough support to become the 
leader of the Republican Party. 
Ted Cruz (Quasi) 
With informal ties to and 
originating from the Tea 
Party, Cruz remains an 
outsider within establishment 
politics.  
Bernie Sanders 
An anti-establishment candidate 
working within the establishment 
as a sitting senator. Though 
unsuccessful in his attempt to lead 
the Democratic Party, Sanders 
was able to garner widespread 
support. 
Establishment Candidates 
Jeb Bush 
During this campaign Jeb Bush represented ‘old 
establishment’ – including his chosen style of 
debate in stark contrast to Trump’s charismatic 
character. 
Hillary Clinton 
Represents globalization’s push for more open 
markets, and ‘more good jobs.’ Insists that 
America is already great – while fringe voters ask, 
“Great for who?” 
Figure 1. Anti-Establishment & Establishment Candidates 
Data Collection 
This design was inspired by the methodology in Paris Aslanidis’ (2018) master 
frame analysis of the 2011 social movements. Within his study, Aslanidis looked at the 
manifestos of the social movements of the Great Recession. Since my work is a case study 
of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries as a continuation of the politics of the Great 
Recession, I will be looking at the framing rhetoric of anti-establishment/establishment 
candidates during the primaries (as identified above) but in keeping with the same 
methodology as the Aslanidis’ 2018 study. 
Official transcripts of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries were sourced from 
the New York Times, Time Magazine, and The Washington Post. Video links of the full 
debates were also sourced through formal channels on YouTube to help provide context 
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and/or clarification pertaining to the transcripts when necessary. To be clear, video links 
were for clarification only, the actual analysis is indeed limited to the transcripts. 
I chose transcripts for this analysis to witness how candidates frame their stance 
among opposition candidates so as to exclude, as much as possible, the framing influence 
of the media. As Gamson (1992) writes, “[f]rames that are present in social movement 
discourse but are invisible in mass media commentary rarely find their way into 
conversations. Systemic omissions make certain ways of framing issues extremely 
unlikely” (p. 6). By looking directly at words and phrases uninterrupted by media 
discourse, I can better analyze context, intent and frame applicability. 
Each transcript was printed to a PDF from its original news source, then 
downloaded and converted into a word document, where line numbers were added to 
properly conduct the frame analysis. Data sources for all the material used in this study 
have been curated and documented, inclusive of links, debate dates, locations, participant 
and moderator names (See Appendices A and B). 
One of the challenges that Aslanidis (2018) came across in his study was with the 
issue of agency during the empirical prognostic framing process (p. 452). The challenge 
was that the social movements of the Great Recession prided themselves on their non-
hierarchical style of leadership. There is no such concern for this case study of the 2016 
American Presidential Primaries, as the candidates were their own agency in continuing 
their cycles of protest, not yet chosen by the people as representatives of “the movement.” 
The challenge that this research does present, however, is simply in its size. Because 
Aslanidis (2018) limited his scope to the manifestos of the movement subjects, the amount 
of lines identified as grievances were limited in findings (p. 450, see also Appendix K). 
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Since the data I am considering is a bit larger, with back and forth dialogue between 
candidates, as well as opening and closing statements over a period of 20 debates, the 
transcript material extrapolates into a far greater number of documented ‘lines’ in the 
analysis. I will do my best to illustrate the findings in a way that can be easily viewed, 
despite the size of transcriptions. 
Methodology 
This research design has three parts. The first is the master frame analysis of the 
2016 American Primary debates, including the necessary inductive and deductive phases. 
In the second part of the design, the findings of part one will be compared to the 2016 Pew 
Research report findings, which polled the top issues that concerned voters during the 2016 
election (Appendix I). And lastly, the findings of the master frame analysis are then 
compared to a similar and prior study on the social movements of the Great Recession 
(Appendix K).  
The research design of the master frame analysis follows the major framing tasks 
of social movements as suggested by Benford and Snow (2000) combined with Goffman’s 
(1974) influence in looking at the meaning making work of cognition. In this process I first 
conduct an inductive framing analysis on all of the subjects’ speaking parts within the 
official transcripts of the 2016 debates. For this phase I follow the practical instructions of 
Baldwin Van Gorp (2010) who suggests that “the intention of an inductive framing analysis 
is to reconstruct the frames that are useful to define a certain topic” (p. 92). From here I am 
able to assess the totality of the content for themes according to Benford and Snow’s (2000) 
framing tasks. 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 41 
This means I am looking at how the candidacies positioned what they were saying 
according to the major framing tasks of the diagnostic frame (identifying a grievance and 
who or what the candidate is ascribing blame to for the grievance); the prognostic frame (a 
declaration of the necessary solutions), and the motivational frame (devices motivating 
bystanders and voters to action) (Benford & Snow, 2000). The framing and reasoning 
devices used by each candidate are identified to help indicate “the presence of the frame in 
a subsequent deductive phase, thus limiting, or even eliminating, subjectivity from the 
framing analysis” (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 92). 
Grievances, perpetrators and subsequent solutions as well as framing devices are 
then identified and coded into a frame matrix. Once the matrix of the inductive phase is 
complete, I move to the deductive phase. This phase “is based on principles of doing 
quantitative content analysis which deal with measuring the extent to which inductively 
reconstructed frame packages are actually applied in a representative sample of texts” (Van 
Gorp, 2010, p. 99). In this phase I look for “clusters in the coded devices,” (p. 100) where 
framing findings within the inductive phase can be grouped into larger themes. For 
example, specifically named businesses who are being blamed for a grievance (i.e. AIG 
Corp) can be deducted into being part of a perpetrator group called ‘corporations.’ 
Once the inductive and deductive phases are complete, I am ready to prepare the 
master analysis where I compare grievances, blame, prognosis and devices across all 
debates and all selected candidates, again deducting findings into larger themes where 
deemed appropriate.  
There will then be a comparison of the 2016 master frame analysis and the Pew 
Research findings that polled American voters on what they thought the top issues were for 
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2016. Here I will discuss how these issues relate back to those framed by the candidacies 
of the same time. My hypothesis here is that the top grievances found in my master frame 
analysis will closely resemble those identified in the Pew Research poll.  
And lastly, the research findings of the master frame analysis of the 2016 American 
Presidential Primaries and the anti-establishment candidacies are then compared to the 
findings of the 2018 Aslanidis master frame analysis of the social movements of the Great 
Recession (Appendix K). My hypothesis is that many of the grievances identified during 
the 2011 social movements, will be the same as those identified by the populists of the 
2016 American Presidential Primaries. 
Debate Sources and Other Considerations 
Please note that when I refer to ‘points’ within the results and discussion portion of 
this paper, I am referring to percentage points. Since grievances and perpetrators within the 
frame were looked at first, qualitatively to code the frame, and then quantitatively to 
surmise issue categories, the points refer to the percentage of the named issue in relation 
to other candidates. 
Debates and line numbers referred to herein are coded first according to party and 
then line number. For example: (R01, 237) refers to the first Republican debate, line 
number 237. Another example: (D09, 1290) refers to the ninth Democratic debate, line 
number 1290. A separate bibliography for debate transcript citations are listed according to 
debate number after the main bibliography under the heading “Cited Transcripts.” 
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CHAPTER IV.  RESULTS 
The populist master frame deployed during this period allowed for a wide array of 
grievances as well as their blame attribution. The primary populist candidates of Donald 
Trump and Bernie Sanders came in top for nearly every grievance, meaning, nearly every 
grievance identified within the frame analysis had either Sanders or Trump as its main 
champion. The rhetoric opened new opportunities for defense and opposing opinions, but 
also drove the agenda of the debates, sometimes with the assistance of moderators. 
Undeniably framing contests took place between candidates within the debates. A further 
breakdown follows. 
Grievances 
The overall results of the diagnostic frame shows that the top grievances in the 2016 
American Presidential Primaries were first, the economy (or economic system), followed 
closely by national and international security concerns, then by corruption, rights and 
discrimination and so on (see Figure 2 below and Appendix I for more details). The overall 
data is interesting in itself, which I will discuss later. But when further unpacking the 
findings, we can see how certain grievances presented themselves in comparison between 
establishment and anti-establishment candidacies. 
 
Figure 2. Top Grievances Named by Candidates, 2016 American Primaries 
  
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
Top Grievances Named by Candidates During the
2016 American Presidential Primaries 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 44 
 
The top grievances bifurcated between anti-establishment and establishment 
candidacies (see Appendices C and D, Figures 3, 7) where the top three concerns for anti-
establishment candidates were Economy (including economic system), National and 
International Security (herein referred to as ‘security’) and Corruption. If we look at the 
candidates individually, Trump and Cruz championed security as their top grievance which 
included the issue of a diminishing military, followed by economy and then corruption. 
Sanders on the other hand had economy as his highest grievance followed by corruption 
and then rights and discrimination. 
Establishment candidates were nearly tied between security and economy. 
Economy and rights and discrimination were nearly equal as the top grievance identified 
by Clinton, followed by security. Bush’s grievances were primarily focused on security 
followed loosely by economy. If we look at candidates according to party, however, we see 
that both Sanders and Clinton agree that economy is a top grievance but differ greatly on 
the issue of corruption. It is barely present as an issue with Clinton (Appendix D, Figure 
9). On the Republican side while all three candidates agree that security and economy are 
top issues, only Trump and Cruz (Figures 6, 7) indicate corruption as a grievance. Like 
Clinton, it falls as almost a non-issue for Bush (Appendix D, Figure 10). This data clearly 
supports the notion that establishment candidates rarely point to corruption as a grievance, 
a stark contrast to those working outside establishment norms. I break down the results by 
category below. 
Economy 
Beginning with the economy, this was a category that was expanded to include 
other grievances through the deductive process. The big issues of trade and its impact on 
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jobs, unemployment and low, stagnating wages were included under the overall economic 
category as all of these issues relate to the people’s experiential knowledge of what is 
perceived to affect their immediate economy. Poor trade policy brought up as a grievance 
(and later as a perpetrator as well) affecting American jobs is very much an economic issue. 
The economy not being able to employ people or low wages, which affect how people 
spend money all ultimately fall under the ‘master’ grievance of the economy. Even so, data 
was gathered within each of these categories; granting further revelation (see Figure 10, 
Economic Grievances, Combined, and Appendix E. Economic Grievances: Breakdown). 
The biggest champion of pushing the economy in general as a top grievance was 
Bernie Sanders, followed by Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz and finally, Jeb 
Bush (in that order). For trade, as it relates to jobs and the economy, the main champion of 
this grievance fell to Donald Trump who led the issue by 15 points ahead of Bernie Sanders. 
Talk of trade and the related jobs as a grievance then drops significantly with Ted Cruz 
leading ahead of Hillary Clinton followed by Jeb Bush. Hereafter I will refer to the 
candidates by last name only. 
The terms ‘Unemployment and Underemployment’ made up part of Sanders’ 
framing devices and so it is no surprise that he led the task of raising the issue as a grievance 
by more than 27 points ahead of the nearest challenger, Cruz. This does not mean that the 
other candidates did not think unemployment was an issue, but that they chose to frame the 
issue another way – as covered under jobs related to trade for example. The same thing 
happened with naming the issue of ‘lower, stagnant wages’ as a grievance, where once 
again Bernie Sanders acted as the main champion with a stark difference between himself 
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and the remaining candidates leading by 70 points. The economy overall, however faired 
as the most significant grievance framed during the 2016 American primary debates.  
National / International Security 
The grievances under this category include national and international security in 
general (incorporating a perceived military in decline), foreign relations, and terrorism. On 
this issue, there is definitely a division of support along the lines of ideology as opposed to 
merely establishment versus anti-establishment lines (see Appendix F). 
Foreign policy was framed most often as an issue of grievance by Sanders and 
Trump within just 3 points of each other while establishment candidates, Clinton and Bush 
lagged a full 11 and 19 points respectively, behind Sanders. When we look more 
specifically at the grievances of the condition of the military, and more generally at national 
and international security, Trump is the greatest identifier, followed by Cruz 19 points 
behind, then Bush and Clinton. No mention of this particular grievance was made by 
Sanders. Here we clearly see a demarcation in the naming of grievances according to 
ideology mixed in with an anti-establishment sentiment that I shall discuss later. The final 
grievance falling under the category of foreign policy is terrorism with grievance-naming-
support across the board by all candidates, however the establishment candidacies fell 
behind the populists in naming it as a grievance.  
Corruption 
Corruption, as expected, shows the greatest amount of disparity between 
establishment and anti-establishment candidates (see Appendix G, Figure 12). Bernie 
Sanders led the charge of corruption as a grievance at 45 points, nearly doubling Donald 
Trump next in line, followed by Ted Cruz. As expected, the establishment candidacies of 
Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush, had little mention of corruption. The overall grievance of 
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corruption was identified primarily by anti-establishment candidates throughout the 
debates under the subcategories of an ‘unjust or corrupt democratic process,’ as a charge 
against ‘establishment politics,’ the ‘establishment’ or as ‘waste, fraud and abuse of 
resources.’ Framing devices were heavily employed, specifically by Sanders on this issue. 
He used it as a means of arguing nearly every other grievance with the reasoning that, “very 
little is going to be done to transform our economy and to create the kind of middle class 
we need unless we end a corrupt campaign ﬁnance system which is undermining American 
democracy” (D04, 1454-1456) (New York Times, 2016, January 18, p. 43). 
Rights and Discrimination 
Continuing in order of saliency among candidates, rights and discrimination falls 
into fourth place among the top grievances (see Appendix G, Figure 13). Because 
discrimination and inequality (excluding any discussion of general economic inequality, 
which was reserved under ‘economy’) is so closely tied to rights, these two issues were 
deduced into one and included the subcategories of: discrimination (racism, sexism, gender 
inequality, etc.) and rights (constitutional, women’s, paid family leave, pro-choice, pro-
life, property, religious liberty, veterans and work/union). Although I grouped these two 
together, I will break down the results here so as to reveal right and left leanings as well as 
differentials in establishment versus non-establishment candidacies which I will take up in 
Chapter V. Beginning with Rights, there is concern about rights across all candidates led 
by Sanders at 30 points followed by Clinton, 9 points behind.  
With respect to Discrimination and Inequality, we see much more of an ideological 
disparity as opposed to one of establishment versus anti-establishment. Hillary Clinton 
leads in this category at 48 points followed closely by Sanders at 42. The Republican side 
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of the debates, however, showed almost no concern for this particular grievance (see Figure 
13, Appendix G). 
 
Healthcare as An Issue of Access v. An Economic Hinderance 
Healthcare was a top issue for both sides of the aisle, equally important for anti-
establishment and establishment candidacies but for different reasons. On the Democrat 
side Sanders led the issue by nearly 10 points over Clinton. The contention between these 
candidates was in Sanders championing the need for a new single payer system, where 
Clinton wanted to build on the existing system.  
On the side of the Republicans, Trump led the issue, but all Republican candidates 
were in favour of repealing Obamacare. Bush wanted the responsibility of healthcare to 
solely be designated back to the states and Trump wanted something entirely new with the 
promise that he would take care of those who could not take care of themselves. All 
Republican candidates saw the existing system as a strain on the economy (see Figure 14). 
Immigration 
Immigration was a much hotter grievance for Donald Trump leading 12 points 
ahead of Clinton on the issue, although both candidates are in support of immigration 
reform. This is another instance where ideology makes a clear demarcation (see Figure 15). 
On the Democrat side of the debate Clinton and Sanders want immigration reform with a 
path toward citizenship for persons currently without status in the United States. Clinton’s 
support of immigration as a grievance is slightly higher than Sanders which fits in well 
with the backing of rights and discrimination as her prominent campaign issue.  
Donald Trump on the other hand uses a controversial populist frame to make his 
case to build a wall, and to move toward the deportation of ‘illegal immigrants.’ He frames 
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the issue as one of security with a call for a nostalgic ideal: “So, we have a country of laws, 
they're going to go out, and they'll come back if they deserve to come back. If they've had 
a bad record, if they've been arrested, if they've been in jail, they're never coming back. 
We're going to have a country again” (R01, 1078-1081) (Washington Post, 2015, August 
5, p. 33). Trump also often pairs his stance on immigration as an issue of state sovereignty 
through this reasoning device: “I have a very hardline position; we have a country or we 
don't have a country” (R05, 1552-1553) (Washington Post, 2015, December 15, p. 45) (the 
sentiments of which are also mentioned in R02, 1071, 1078; R03, 1367; and R04, 387, 397-
398). 
And of course the top prognostic frame offered by Trump as a solution to the issue 
of ‘illegal’ immigration is to “Build a Wall” (R01, 394) (Washington Post, 2015, August 
5, p. 14) which is mentioned repeatedly throughout the debates. Several mentions were 
also made of fitting the bill of the wall’s construction to Mexico (also in R02, 1065; R03, 
139, 145; R04, 388; R05, 177, 1555; R08, 1685-1686; R09, 913; R10, 411-432, 2328; R11, 
634, 635). 
Division and Rhetoric 
This was an interesting grievance that had made it into the debates with support at 
various levels across the board but meaning different things to establishment versus anti-
establishment candidates (see Figure 16). For Trump and Cruz, rhetoric was brought up as 
a grievance in the form of political correctness. To them, the ability to operate loose rhetoric 
gave them the freedom for a more colourful dialogue; de-sanitizing the political correctness 
of the establishment. For Trump, it was about not having time to be politically correct, 
while for Cruz rhetoric was a way to accuse the other side of not being brave enough to 
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call things as he thought they were: “I want to speak to all the moms and dads whose sons 
and daughters are fighting for this country, and the incredible sense of betrayal when you 
have a commander-in-chief who will not even speak the name of our enemy, radical Islamic 
terrorism” (R06, 1965-1973) (Washington Post, 2016, January 14, p. 60). 
Jeb Bush and Hillary Clinton indicated rhetoric as a grievance of division in stark 
contrast to political correctness, with Jeb often referring to Trump as ‘Divider-in-Chief’ 
during opening and closing statements of the debates: “The Armed Forces Radio is here 
listening to this today. I hope they know that if I'm president, I'll be a commander-in-chief, 
not an agitator-in-chief or a divider-in-chief” (R05, 1335-1337) (Washington Post, 2015, 
December 15, p. 39). The implication is a passive-aggressive attempt at insult with little 
effect. 
Before the very first debate had begun, Jeb Bush had made a public comment about 
Donald Trump’s divisive tone that had made the news. The question of rhetoric entered the 
electoral arena during the debate at the behest of moderator, Megyn Kelly. A question was 
first posed to Bush and then again to Trump. Trump’s response was framed in such a way 
that tone was nothing in comparison to the urgent grievance of terrorism:  
The one thing he did say about me, however, was my tone. And I also 
understand that. But when you have people that are cutting Christians' heads 
off, when you have a world that the border and at so many places, that it is 
medieval times, we've never – it almost has to be as bad as it ever was in 
terms of the violence and the horror, we don't have time for tone. We have 
to go out and get the job done (R01, 1321-1326) (Washington Post, 2015, 
August 6, p. 40). 
Trump’s rhetoric from news reports and rallies often made their way into the 
electoral arena in the form of moderator questions during the debates. For example, Jake 
Tapper posed this question to Trump and then later asked the same question of Marco 
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Rubio: “Last night, you told CNN quote, “Islam hates us?” Did you mean all 1.6 billion 
Muslims?” (R12, 736-738) (New York Times, 2016, March 11, p. 20). Correcting 
himself to the term of ‘radical Islamic terrorism’ Trump used framing to blame ‘political 
correctness’ for getting in the way of dealing with what he had earlier termed as hate: “Now 
you can say what you want, and you can be politically correct if you want. I don’t want 
to be so politically correct. I like to solve problems. We have a serious, serious problem 
of hate” (R12, 776-778) (New York Times, 2016, March 11, p. 21). The charge of political 
correctness “frequently got [Trump] out of tight spots during interviews and demonstrates 
how far he managed to stretch the ‘Overton Window’ of acceptable public discourse” 
(Kaufman, 2019, p. 118). 
Trump’s rhetoric was such a topic during the overall primary season that during the 
fifth Republican debate a frustrated Trump questioned moderators about why their 
questions were always about what he says and how he says it: 
I think it's very sad that CNN leads Jeb Bush, Governor Bush, down a road 
by starting off virtually all the questions, “Mr. Trump this, Mister” -- I think 
it's very sad. And, frankly, I watched -- I think it's very sad. And, frankly, I 
watched the first debate, and the first long number of questions were, “Mr. 
Trump said this, Mr. Trump said that. Mr. Trump”– these poor guys … I 
thought it was very unfair that virtually the entire early portion of the debate 
was Trump this, Trump that, in order to get ratings, I guess (R05, 1340-
1349) (Washington Post, 2015, December 15, p. 39). 
For Sanders, Trump’s rhetoric was simply something of an irritation when brought 
up by other candidates or moderators; getting back to his primary framing device was key: 
“All of us have denounced Trump’s attempts to divide this country: the anti‑Latino rhetoric, 
the racist rhetoric, the anti‑Muslim rhetoric. But where I disagree with you, Governor 
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O’Malley, is I do believe we have to deal with the fundamental issues of a handful of 
billionaires…” (D04, 629-633) (New York Times, 2016, January 18, p. 19). 
Infrastructure 
“Crumbling infrastructure” (a framing device used by Sanders throughout the 2016 
debates) became a euphemism for ‘build it and get the economic boost and jobs that come 
with it.’ Addressing the infrastructure issue was a means of creating new jobs while also 
fixing something that had clearly been ignored over the years (see Figure 17) (D01, line 
1041; D02, line 968; D03, line 825; D04, 93, 579, 843, D05, 188-189, 1390, D06, 106-
109, 228, D07, 70, 154, 217, and D08, line 915). This was an issue especially highlighted 
during the debate hosted in Flint, Michigan, where the spotlight was heavily placed on the 
Flint Water Crisis by both candidates and debate moderators. During the debate in Flint, 
the grievance of infrastructure, however, was quickly linked to one of discrimination and 
inequality – an underlying systemic racism that made cutting corners on something as 
important as water even possible: 
One wonders if this were a white suburban community what kind of 
response there would have been… Flint, Michigan, is a poor community. It 
is disproportionately African‑American and minority. And what has 
happened there is absolutely unacceptable (D05, 1264-1266) (New York 
Times, 2016, February 5, p, 35). 
Education, Both A Grievance and Solution 
The ideological battle over education is a battle of Democrats wanting the quality 
of education to be controlled at the federal level in order to improve it at the local level, 
and the Republicans wanting to turn that responsibility and ‘say so’ back to the state level. 
The Republicans have a consensus on the issue. The Democrats do not (see Figure 18). 
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The establishment versus anti-establishment battle about education exists on the 
Democrat side only, and as a nuanced argument on behalf of Sanders that today’s 
educational requirements at the college level, are what was expected years ago at the basic 
high school level, and therefore should be free for everyone. To pay for it, he suggests that 
a speculation tax, which was mentioned multiple times throughout each of the debates: 
“…we are going to have a tax on Wall Street speculation, which will bring in more than 
enough money to provide free tuition at public colleges and universities and lower the 
outrageous level of student debt” (D09, 1289-1291, p. 37).  
The support for education changes from a grievance (too expensive, should be free) 
to a solution for discrimination and criminal justice reform. What started out in the first 
debate as this: “It seems to me that instead of building more jails and providing more 
incarceration, maybe – just maybe – we should be putting money into education and jobs 
for our kids” (D01, 125-127) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, p. 4) turns into the 
slogan of “Jobs and education, not jails and incarceration” (D04, 253-254) (New York 
Times, 2016, January 18, p. 8). 
Climate Change 
Climate change was a completely one-sided grievance on the part of the Democrats, 
but within that camp, how climate change was framed varied greatly. To Sanders climate 
change was elevated to global security status and was an issue that should be fought in the 
same way that a country prepares to go to war: 
You know, if we, God forbid, were attacked tomorrow the whole country 
would rise up and say we got an enemy out there and we got to do something 
about it. That was what 9/11 was about. We have an enemy out there, and 
that enemy is going to cause drought and ﬂoods and extreme weather 
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disturbances. There’s going to be international conﬂict (D09, 791-799) 
(New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 23). 
Clinton on the other hand, frames climate change as an opportunity for green jobs; 
and although she supports fracking, she waits until the final debate to clarify her support 
of fracking as only a bridge: “I don’t think I’ve changed my view on what we need to do 
to go from where we are, where the world is heavily dependent on coal and oil, but 
principally coal, to where we need to be, which is clean renewable energy, and one of the 
bridge fuels is natural gas” (D09, 866-869) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 25). On 
the Republican side, in opposition to any movement on climate change, establishment 
candidate Jeb Bush says that the United States needs to “embrace the energy revolution in 
our country” (R01, 991) (Washington Post, 2015, August 6, p. 30); the energy revolution 
meaning natural gas and the XL pipelines. 
The framing analysis (see Figure 21) points to climate change as both a grievance, 
but also as a perpetrator. There are a few instances within this study that make this similar 
transition and it depends on how the issue is framed. Though the issue of education, for 
example, was identified as a grievance by some, it was also presented as a solution to 
another grievance by others. In the case of climate change, on the one hand for Sanders it 
is a grave threat to humanity, although, not big enough that it sits as his top grievance. 
Again, his strategic logic is that if you do not fix a corrupt system, you will not be able to 
fix anything. Still within the diagnostic frame, Sanders also sees climate change as a source 
of blame as well as a grievance. When questioned by Dickerson if he still believed that “the 
greatest threat to national security was climate change,” Sanders responded:  
Absolutely. In fact, climate change is directly related to the growth of 
terrorism. And if we do not get our act together and listen to what the 
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scientists say, you're going to see countries all over the world – this is what 
the CIA says – they're going to be struggling over limited amounts of water, 
limited amounts of land to grow their crops ask you're going to see all kinds 
of international conflict (D02, 117-121) (Washington Post, 2015, p. 4). 
Timing and Other Issues 
The issues of social security and democratic participation fell more to party lines 
than to disparities between establishment and anti-establishment framing (Figures 21, 24). 
Democratic participation was brought up the least and was mostly one-sided with its 
biggest champion being Bernie Sanders. Supreme Court Choice reached salience as an 
issue at the passing of Justice Scalia in February 2016. Candidates debated if President 
Barack Obama should or could have someone appointed before the next election. Debate 
discussions then became about the sort of litmus tests that potential appointees would have 
to pass in order to earn their respective appointments. For Ted Cruz, the litmus test was 
about constitutional integrity, specifically about religious rights. For the Democrat camp, 
the litmus test had to do with the willingness to overturn Citizens United. 
Certain grievances, like the supreme court choice, terrorism or foreign policy, 
spiked according to events of the new cycle. The news cycle therefore had an influence on 
the grievances and perpetrators of the day as they were brought up and discussed during 
the debates by moderators, but also in opening and closing remarks by candidates. While 
on the top of the news cycle, the media itself was brought up by the populists – this before 
becoming Trump’s ‘enemy of the people.’ They were served up as more of a perpetrator, 
though not in any significant way. The data, however, shows that all three populist 
candidates took issue with the media, usually in the context of not reporting on the real 
news (see Figure 35). 
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Perpetrators 
The top four perpetrators blamed for the grievances of 2016 were big business, poor 
foreign policy, corruption, government and a ‘rigged’ economic system. Big business 
included the subcategories of corporations, the top 1 percent, and any who were identified 
as business persons throughout the debate (see Appendix H., Figures 25-29). There is a 
spike in business persons by Ted Cruz, as much of his debates were targeted toward Trump 
as a businessman who was trying to corrupt the political process through his donations. 
Notice in Figure 25, the only one not blaming business persons is Donald Trump. In the 
remaining subcategories of big business, we can see the fruits of Sanders’ framing work of 
the one percent: “we tell the billionaire class, they cannot have it all. For a start, they're 
going to start to pay their fair share of taxes” (D03, 820-821) (Washington Post, 2015, 
December 19, p. 22). 
Foreign policy received a large spike of interest throughout the debates, again, 
relating to the events of the news cycle. In January 2016, for example, the news and image 
of U.S. Navy sailors in the kneeling position under arrest by Iranian officials had a 
profound effect on Ted Cruz throughout the debate. Security issues, issues of foreign 
policy, and terrorism became highly salient: 
Today, many of us picked up our newspapers, and we were horrified to see 
the sight of 10 American sailors on their knees, with their hands on their 
heads. In that State of the Union, President Obama didn't so much as 
mention the 10 sailors that had been captured by Iran (R06, 26-29) 
(Washington Post, 2016, January 14, p. 1). 
The same thing happened during the news cycle of the Paris bombing in November 
2015, and the San Bernadino attack in December 2015. These events especially heightened 
nationalist and emotional appeals on the right, where issues of national security, a military 
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in decline were brought up as grievances. The main perpetrator of poor foreign policy 
decisions primarily related back to the decision to go to war in Iraq, a blame that had 
consensus among all populist candidates, but mostly Trump and Sanders (see Appendix H, 
Figure 27). 
Corruption was often tied to other grievances – a “corrupt criminal justice system” 
for instance as framed by Bernie Sanders. But general corruption as a perpetrator was 
almost never pointed out or named by establishment candidates (Appendix D, Figure 39). 
The perpetrators that had more of a consensus among candidates, but still higher with anti-
establishment candidates were the healthcare industry and drug companies, as well as the 
economy in general (see Appendix H., Figures 28 and 29). 
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CHAPTER V.  DISCUSSION 
Name it, blame it, and then propose to change it, is a system that the populist 
candidates of 2016-America did very well. It is not as though these anti-establishment 
candidacies were necessarily consciously choosing to employ the populist frame while 
performing their rhetoric, but almost as though Judis’ (2016) version of populism used as 
a type of logic, became innate.  
Both grievances and perpetrators were plentiful and again well documented and 
almost universally accepted by the public in the framing work already done by the social 
movements of the Great Recession. When both Sanders and Trump named a grievance, in 
almost every case there was a specifically attributed blame. Their frames, with the use of 
persistent reasoning and framing devices remain consistent throughout the primary 
debates. The populist candidates did indeed “make populist rhetoric the center of their 
campaigns” (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p. 191). 
Establishment Counters the Frame: Diffusion, Deflection, Defense or Denial 
When confronted with the rampant depravity of Wall Street and its influence on 
establishment politicians, Clinton’s response to Sanders’ framing work was one of three 
things: She diffused or deflected the accusation, she defended the actions or character of 
existing establishment, or she denied altogether that she was even part of the establishment. 
In reaction to accusations, Clinton consistently steered her rhetorical performance away 
from the precise naming of grievances, instead opting to go straight to a solution. Rather 
than specifically naming blame, Clinton’s attributions (with the exceptions of AIG and 
Lehman Brothers), were more abstract in nature: 
We’ve talked a lot tonight about what we’re against — we’re against 
income inequality. We’re against the abuses of powerful interests. We’re 
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against a lot of things. I’m for a lot of things. I don’t want to just stop bad 
things from happening, I want to start good things... (D05, 1341-1346) 
(New York Times, 2015, February 5, p. 38). 
Clinton’s use of ambiguity in labeling what people are against before pivoting to 
something new is an attempt at diffusion. Gamson (1995) describes this process whereby 
“vague and abstract sources of unfairness diffuse indignation and make it seem foolish” (p. 
91). Sanders is trying desperately in his framing to point to an injustice, accusing politicians 
and SuperPACs for the creation of a corrupt democratic process. Clinton in return tries to 
diffuse the accusation (as one who had received SuperPAC funding) by lumping concerns 
under the generic titles of ‘inequality ‘and ‘abuses of powerful interests’ without specificity 
of a defined culprit. And rather than answer to it, her aim was to redirect the conversation. 
If the perpetrator is diffused to a larger than life, immaterial construct, assigning blame in 
order to seek some sort of correction or retribution serves to discredit the accuser by making 
them appear irrational in their appeal. Gamson (1995) describes this as trying to blame the 
rain for ruining the parade and expecting others to do something about it. “When 
impersonal and abstract forces are responsible for our suffering, we are taught to accept 
what cannot be changed and make the best of it” (p. 91). 
Another tactic that was used by establishment candidates came in the form of 
deflection; accepting blame but then also pointing to another to soften any impending 
setback. Gamson (1998) writes that “[i]f reification does not prevent the development of 
an injustice frame... accepting human agency while diverting the focus toward external 
targets or internal opponents” (p. 91) becomes a strategy.  
Instead of addressing job loss and low, stagnating wages credited by Sanders’ to the 
charge of “disastrous trade deals” throughout the 2016 Democratic debates, Clinton rarely 
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mentions unemployment and low wages. Instead she presses on the issue of creating “more 
good jobs” (e.g. D01, 144) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, p. 4). 
An example where both diffusion and deflection are used in a single response to 
Sanders’ harp on Wall Street happens during the sixth Democratic debate, where Clinton 
says:  
We agree that we’ve got to get unaccountable money out of politics. We 
agree that Wall Street should never be allowed to wreck Main Street again. 
But here’s the point I want to make tonight. I am not a single‑issue 
candidate... I think that a lot of what we have to overcome to break down 
the barriers that are holding people back… (D06, 1241-1253) (New York 
Times, 2016, p. 32). 
Here she concedes that there is a problem with corruption in politics but does not 
accept responsibility for it as she frames it as a nearly unsolvable abstraction under the 
guise of “unaccountable money.” But then she immediately attempts to change the 
conversation from the grievance of Wall Street corruption to one of rights and barriers.  
In response to being questioned about being part of a ‘dynastic’ establishment 
politics, Bush responded, “I've got a record in Florida. I'm proud of my dad, and I'm 
certainly proud of my brother. In Florida, they called me Jeb, because I earned it … I am 
my own man” (D01, 160-161) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, p. 5-6). Concerning 
accusations of the influence of SuperPACs, Clinton pointed to how President Barack 
Obama had raised the most amount of money in history and yet also put into law the 
toughest regulations to date on Wall Street in the form of the Dodd-Frank legislation. For 
instance during the 7th debate, Clinton countered Sanders’ frame about the corrupt 
campaign system with this: 
But, the real issue, I think, that the Senator is injecting into this is that if you 
had a Super PAC, like President Obama has… If you take donations from 
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Wall Street, you can’t be independent. I would just say, I debated then-
Senator Obama numerous times on stages like this, and he was the recipient 
of the largest number of Wall Street donations of anybody running on the 
Democratic side ever. Now, when it mattered, he stood up and took on Wall 
Street (D07, 736-742) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 19). 
On similar charges of campaign influence, Jeb Bush, simply replies: “I'm not going 
to be bought by anybody” after admitting that he took money from Donald Trump, but also 
stood against him on casino gambling in Florida (R02, 388-390; 398) (Washington Post, 
September 16, p. 12). These responses suggest that Super PACs and corporately funded 
campaign funds do not have to interfere with Washington. Clinton’s response uses 
establishment past as an illustrative example that despite all the SuperPAC campaign 
support held by Obama, when the 2008 recession hit and the housing bubble burst, he 
pushed through the Dodd‑Frank regulation, touted as “the toughest regulations since the 
1930’s” (D06, 743-744) (New York Times, 2016, February 12, p. 19).  
Further defense of establishment came in the form of an implied accusation that 
Sanders was playing the gatekeeper role of progressive establishment: 
But I’ve heard Senator Sanders comments, and it’s really caused me to 
wonder who’s left in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. Under 
his deﬁnition, President Obama is not progressive because he took 
donations from Wall Street; Vice President Biden is not progressive because 
he supported Keystone… (D05, 154-159) (New York Times, 2016, 
February 5 p. 5). 
It is fair to say, Senator, that in your deﬁnition, as you being the 
self‑proclaimed gatekeeper for progressivism, I don’t know anyone else 
who ﬁts that deﬁnition, but I know a lot of really hard ﬁghting progressives 
in the Democratic party who have stood up time, and time again against 
special interests… (D05, 237-241) (New York Times, 2016, February 5, p. 
7).  
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During the final debate Clinton equated an attack on her to an attack on 
President Obama again reminding the audience that despite taking SuperPAC support 
in 2008, he still came up with the Dodd-Frank legislation to reel in Wall Street. How 
dare she be accused of not being able to stand up to Wall Street when her predecessor 
had: “Well, make — make no mistake about it, this is not just an attack on me, it’s an 
attack on President Obama… [He] took tens of millions of dollars from contributors. 
And President Obama was not at all inﬂuenced when he made the decision to pass and 
sign Dodd‑Frank…” (D09, 147-153) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 5). 
On the occasions that corruption was conceded as a problem, in the case of Clinton, 
it was only done so as a grievance of the past, for example: “I went to Wall Street when I 
was a United States senator. I told them they were wrecking the economy. I asked for a 
moratorium on foreclosures” (D07, 475-476) (New York Times, March 7, p. 15). Such 
concessions, however, were followed up with but “now we have tools, laws that we didn’t 
have before” (D07, line 510) (New York Times, March 7, p. 16). Attacks against 
establishment were downplayed as being mere disagreements that opposition was masking 
as corruption: “it’s always a little bit, uh, challenging because, you know, if Senator 
Sanders doesn’t agree with how you are approaching something, then you are a member of 
the establishment” (D09, 1468-1470) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 42). 
When confronted as being part of corrupt establishment by Bernie Sanders, Clinton 
denied that she was part of the establishment on at least two occasions – based on her 
gender status: 
1) “Well, I can't think of anything more of an outsider than electing the first 
woman president, but I'm not just running because I would be the first 
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woman president” (D01, 1616-1618) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, 
p. 47).   
2) “Well, look, I’ve got to just jump in here because, honestly, Senator 
Sanders is the only person who I think would characterize me, a woman 
running to be the ﬁrst woman president, as exemplifying the establishment” 
(D05, 317-319) (New York Times, February 5, p. 9).   
3) “I am not a natural politician, in case you haven’t noticed, like my 
husband or President Obama. So I have a view that I just have to do the best 
I can” (D08, 608-609) (New York Times, March 10, p. 18). 
Diagnosing a Growing Insecurity 
In the 2019 documentary, “Knock the House Down,” when referring to the struggle 
against the establishment of New York, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC) says, “This is not 
just about Democrat versus Republican, in fact it’s so far away from that. It’s not left and 
right, it’s up and down” (Blotnick & Lears, 2019, Time 6:00 min). This, of course, is a 
populist statement, and a powerful us versus them framing in regular politics, but one that 
is even more potent when trying to get power from within the same party. In this 2018 
congressional race, AOC is going against long-time establishment Democrat, Joseph 
Crowley. Within this context, a ‘left versus right’ frame within the same party, makes little 
sense, and becomes a lot less effective. The same framing logic was evident during the 
respective camps of Sanders versus Clinton and Trump versus everyone else running for 
Republican leadership. 
But who is up and who is down varies according to perspective. The populist who 
can tap into the people’s experiential knowledge (Goffman, 1974) will be the one who 
drives the up and down frame toward increased political opportunity and ultimate voter 
support. Simply put, insecurity and perceived corruption is fodder for populists to use in 
identity meaning-making work within the collective action frame – to reach those who have 
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been ex-communicated and excluded in a changing economic or societal system. This 
means that a Sanders’ and an AOC’s up and down perspective can vary greatly for instance 
from that of a Donald Trump (of which I will provide an example shortly).  
Referring back to the credibility borrowed by populists from the 2011 social 
movements, if people did not feel the experiences that populists described in 2016, populist 
candidates would have no legitimacy, no footing and no opportunity to move forward. Most 
of the grievances that were made in stark contrast to establishment, involved larger global 
structural changes. And so if we look further to the underlying foundations of these 
grievances, the populists do, to an extent, have some scholarly support. Academics began 
calling attention to structural contention even before the 2011 social movements began – 
calling it an “unprecedented phenomenon of exclusion” (Sánchez, 2010, p. 71). “The 
transformation of world productive structures” were credited for the creation of this 
exclusion by “[modifying] productive processes in a severe way” (Sánchez, 2010, p. 71). 
Sanchez (2010) suggests that “[t]he worst inequalities today make up a difference between 
people not only in terms of ‘up’ and ‘down’ but also in terms of who are ‘in’ – protected – 
and ones who are ‘out’ – those who are rejected” (Sánchez, 2010, p. 71, also Wieviorka, 
2007).  
This up and down, and in an out determination by structures, suits the ‘us versus 
them’ language of populism, thus justifying it in a sense as a natural strategic partner for 
anti-establishment candidacies. Recall how Judis (2016) described populism as a type of 
vertical logic in Chapter II. The frictions caused by structural changes helps explain the 
real insecurities that were tapped into by the populists of 2016 (see Appendix J).  
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What is interesting here is that while evolving structures determine who is in and 
who is out (a non-technical, diminishing middle class would be out for instance), the 
framing work of populism through its vertical logic, seeks to expand membership by 
gaining those ousted by structures to gain momentum over establishment:  
Identity in PSMs is much broader than the average movement, stretching to 
cover nearly all available audiences. The in-group is not a small social 
minority (e.g., sexual minorities, immigrants) or even a somewhat larger 
swath of society (e.g., women, workers, the poor, pensioners, students, etc.); 
rather, it is the people as a whole, save the vastly outnumbered elites 
(Aslanidis, 2016, p. 306). 
In 2016, to Sanders, a disadvantaged 99% was down and a corrupt, self-serving one 
percent was up (see Appendix G). To Trump, a forgotten class of workers were down, the 
nation’s border security and the means to defend it was down, and the elite leadership 
charged with producing the perceived losing ethos was up (see Appendix E, Trade and 
Related Job Loss, Appendix F, Appendix G, Figures 15 and 12 respectively). Their frames 
sought to include those who identified as “the vulnerable,” those who were losing or who 
had always struggled for access to the structural arenas that ran the world. This relates back 
to Huntington’s (1968) theory on modernization, where establishment policies fail to keep 
up with changing cultures and structures discussed in Chapter II. 
Fear and Hope in Changing Structures and Lost Identities 
We now know how structures that work for some at the exclusion of others in part 
serves to create opportunity for populists to transform a vulnerable ‘people’ into to a voter 
base. To mobilize this transition, however, requires a significant amount emotional frame-
work. Aminzade and McAdam’s (2001) exploration on emotions used within collective 
action frames point to the coupling work of distress and hope. An emotional framework 
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seeks first to heighten a distressed emotion followed by a constructed hope for something 
more: “It is only when anger gets joined with hope that the forms of action we normally 
associate with social movements and revolutions are apt to take place” (p. 32). The 
distressed emotion can range from anger, to fear including “threats to meaning and 
membership” (p. 37). Loss of something once had – a status, security, maybe even certain 
rights can also serve as the distressed emotion. To identify emotions is one thing. To 
effectively execute their use as part of the motivational task in framing, is another. Though 
seemingly innate, the aptitude to identify and tap into these emotions requires a leader with 
the “ability to deploy emotional knowledge and define or manipulate emotion rules” (p. 
35). Here we can see the potential for either a statesmen or demagogue (Federici, 1991) to 
emerge, but still, a populist.  Both the Trump and Sanders’ camps relied heavily on the 
emotional aspect of framing – but as research would find it, so did Cruz and Clinton.  
During the 2016 debate in Milwaukee, Clinton warned America that supporting 
Sanders’ and his one-track issue of corruption, would do little to lift their barriers; her 
attempt at countering the attack on establishment: 
Yes, does Wall Street and big ﬁnancial interests, along with drug 
companies, insurance companies, big oil, all of it, have too much inﬂuence? 
You’re right. But if we were to stop that tomorrow, we would still have the 
indifference, the negligence that we saw in Flint. We would still have racism 
holding people back. We would still have sexism preventing women from 
getting equal pay. We would still have LGBT people who get married on 
Saturday and get ﬁred on Monday (D06, 1256-1261) (New York Times, 2016, 
February 12, p. 32). 
On the right-wing, Cruz used fear to try and garner more support when he said, “We 
are one liberal justice away from a ﬁve‑justice radical leftist majority that would undermine 
our religious liberty…” (R10, 805-808) (New York Times, 2016, February 26, p. 25). 
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Trump’s reasoning device of “We don’t win anymore” (R01, 196) (Washington Post, 2015, 
August 6, p. 7) was a line meant to trigger feelings of American, nationalist pride – but also 
shame, followed by the hopeful anecdote of “Make America Great Again” used ad nauseum 
in and out of debates. On the issue of terrorism, he used fear when he told Americans that 
there was a problem of “tremendous hate” toward the U.S. (R12, 788) (New York times, 
2016, March 11, p. 21). On the issue of healthcare, his emotional trigger attempt was 
toward that of anger when he said that “insurance companies are getting rich on 
Obamacare” (R08, 752-753) (New York Times, 2016, February 7, p. 22). 
For Sanders, fear was reserved mostly for issues of foreign policy and climate 
change. He accused both the Democrats and Republicans of poor foreign policy decisions 
which destabilized the Middle East in their support for regime change when he said, “[b]ut 
the point about foreign policy is not just to know that you can overthrow a terrible dictator, 
it’s to understand what happens the day after” (D06, 886-887) (New York Times, 2016, 
February 12, p. 23). It is important to note that a very similar frame of reference was also 
used by Trump (R09, 254-255) (New York Times, 2016, February 14). With respect to 
climate change, Sanders warned that “we have got to realize that this is a global 
environmental crisis of unprecedented urgency… We have an enemy out there, and that 
enemy is going to cause drought and ﬂoods and extreme weather disturbances. There’s 
going to be international conﬂict” (D09, 791-792; 797-798) (New York Times, 2016, April 
15, p. 23). On the issue of corruption, the emotional requirement Sanders was asking for 
from supporters was one of anger against the systems in place – so much so that it was his 
hope that they would be part of the march to ‘stand up and change it, something he said, 
more than once, at nearly every debate: “And we can do that when millions of people stand 
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up, ﬁght back, and create a government that works for all of us, not just the 1 percent” 
(D09, 1706-1707) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 49). The frame analysis performed 
for this study, therefore, supports the theory of heavy emotional framework. Reasoning and 
framing devices were used throughout the debates as a means of triggering emotions and 
mobilizing voters toward consensus and action.  
Addiction and the Opioid Crisis 
Backing on the discussion of the use of emotion in frame work, there exists a 
potential for further nuance. During the debates, there is talk about the opioid crisis. One 
of the host states, New Hampshire was dealing with this issue at an unprecedented level at 
the time of the debates and so of course, it was brought up by both candidates and 
moderators. There was also talk about pockets of unemployed, white neighborhoods, that 
had fallen victim to changes in industry, energy trends and trade deals. This paper focuses 
on the period of 2015-2016, where we see addiction and opioids being raised as a concern 
at the national level for the first time in a while within the establishment/electoral arena. 
At the time of this writing (early 2019) addiction grievances in New Hampshire has 
increased – “An astonishing 53 percent of adults said in a Granite State poll last year that 
drugs were the biggest problem facing the state — the first time in the poll’s history that a 
majority named a single issue as the most important. (Jobs and the economy lagged a 
distant second)” (Seelye, 2018, p. 3). The New York Times cited several possible factors of 
the state’s decline into drug chaos, as discussed by researchers. Proximity to illegal drug 
distribution points, cuts in drug treatment programs, the over-prescription of opioids by 
doctors and then subsequent crackdowns that led more people searching for street-
alternatives were all suspect. But researchers also pointed to “pockets of ‘economic 
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degradation,’ especially in rural areas where jobs are few, and that may contribute to the 
problem” (p. 3). To suggest that job loss is feeding the opioid crisis is conjecture at best; 
more studies in this area are needed. But the loss of identity; loss of individual productivity 
and feeling of worthiness, especially amidst the sweeping changes in structures of 
employment, can point toward a future of further contention. 
For a demographic where no jobs, lost identities, and a futureless feeling are 
commonplace, is it any wonder then that when someone with a little bit of hope comes 
along and practices a rhetoric that feels as though they are being directly spoken to, 
responds? Subsequently, there has been a long-suffering portion of the American public 
who has felt these same grievances since before the time of slavery. It is why Clinton, the 
primary establishment candidate in 2016, purports to champion for those who are being 
discriminated against, and those facing “barriers” – barriers she promised to break down. 
Keep in mind that this is on the heels of other social movements and contentious American 
politics that has been happening all the while in the background – Black Lives Matter, 
#MeToo, etcetera. And so perhaps at the crux of all this contention, at the behest of 
changing superstructures, we can look back to Huntington’s (1968) suggestion that 
“sources of identity and association… may be undermined and destroyed... Others, 
however, may achieve a new consciousness and become the basis for new organization 
because they are capable” (Huntington, 1968, p. 38). As one part of the American 
population seeks to solidify their voice, rightfully pushing for more – more inclusion, more 
access and equality; all the while celebrating their collective identities, a newly vulnerable, 
other part of the population is losing theirs. 
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2016 Pew Research Poll Comparison 
Here I compare the grievances made salient during the framing process of the 
debates as identified through the research of this paper to those identified by a Pew 
Research poll taken during the 2016 primaries. The Pew Research Poll asked voters what 
their top issues were for 2016. The economy was the top concern for voters (see Appendix 
I), and the findings of this frame analysis agree. The economy heavily resonated with both 
Republican and Democrat camps; a clear 80% of Clinton supporters conceded to it being 
the most important issue, while 90% of Trump supporters agreed (Pew Research Center, 
2016, p. 51).  
Both the findings of this paper’s frame analysis and the 2016 Pew Research poll 
tell an even larger story which resonates with the growing insecurity of our time. In 2016, 
despite publicized reports of an increasing threat of climate change, for instance, climate 
change during this time ranked lower on the list of voter issues. “Only about half of all 
voters (52%) view the environment as very important” (Pew Research Center, 2016, p. 51). 
In this study, it ranked lower as well. As noted earlier much of this ties in with ideological 
underpinnings, as there was no discussion of climate change whatsoever during the 
Republican debates. Of this phenomenon, one might wonder why the moderators – 
Dickerson, Kelly, anyone – never asked about the issue in the first place? Nevertheless, the 
Pew Research findings as well as those from this study points to a hierarchy of grievances 
based on issue saliency during the primary season and highly susceptible to populist 
framing, among other things.  
Security studies reveal that populations find different ways to self-medicate during 
difficult times. In times of insecurity “individuals seek one stable identity (regardless of its 
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actual existence) to achieve biographical continuity in the context of the uncertain and 
dislocating flux of globalization” (Botterill et al., 2016, p. 126). This coincides with 
Aslanidis’ (2018) notion on how populist collective action frames are used to “construct a 
resonant collective identity of ‘the People’ and to challenge elites” (p. 301). 
Framing tactics aside, the saliency of an issue is also based on its resonance and 
priority level for the voter. For example, without mitigating the importance of the 
environment, Scruggs and Benegal (2012) in a study done shortly after the Great 
Recession, found that public opinion on issues underwent significant changes while in 
crises. During the Great Recession, for instance, there was a considerable decline in climate 
change convictions “around 10-20% over a short period of a year or two,” suggesting “that 
the decline in belief about climate change is most likely driven by the economic insecurity 
caused by the Great Recession” (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012, p. 505-6). This change in 
conviction does not diminish the significance of any one issue in the Pew Research findings 
(2016), rather, it points to a voter vulnerability toward issue saliency based on the 
insecurities and grievances at hand.  
The populists, whether warranted or not, and whether intentional or not, in 2015-
16, were making an appeal to the insecurities of the US electorate. The 2008 recession, and 
how it was made manifest, not only in the United States, but Canada and Europe made an 
international audience painfully aware of the frailties of a global, neo-liberalist society. 
Growing insecurities point to the presence of contention, a political opportunity for 
intervention – and a constituency vulnerable to a populist master frame. 
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2011 Social Movements of the Great Recession Comparison 
The top four grievances personified during the 2016 American primary debates 
were grievances that were also identified in Aslandis’ (2018) frame analysis (Appendix K). 
In his study there was some variance between the movements of Spain, Greece and the 
USA, but within America, corruption, rights and equality were commensurate with my 
findings of economy, security, corruption and rights (see Appendices C and K). The 
Aslanidis (2018) frame analysis involved the manifestos of the social movements of the 
Great Recession. The line numbers within his findings were fewer because of his limited 
scope (manifestos only). His categories, on the other hand, were more varied than those of 
this study, as clusters of grievances in this study were further deduced into single 
categories.  
When it comes to perpetrators, however, our studies seem to have a consensus. Both 
the social movements of the Great Recession and the populists of the 2016 primary debates 
identified politicians, corporations, the economic system, and government (or what I refer 
to as establishment) as the main perpetrators (See Appendices H and K). 
A Prescribed Nostalgic Ideal 
In the 1600s, nostalgia was a diagnosis; a medical illness relating to symptoms of 
homesickness, typically suffered by those away at war (Goldman, 2016).  To progressives, 
the idea of basing decisions on a sentimentality of the past made little sense as the whole 
notion of being ‘progressive’ was to make progress toward something newer and better 
than before. To refer to nostalgia as a progressive, therefore, was akin to backward thinking 
or “an obstacle to the reorganization of society along rational lines” (p. 211). But the use 
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of nostalgia no longer falls according to party lines, and in 2016, its use within the electoral 
arena had plenty of support.  
Neil Irwin (2016) writes, “The economics of nostalgia may capture the hearts of a 
certain portion of voters. But it is disconnected from the decades-long direction of the 
United States economy and the interests of the businesses that are historically a crucial part 
of the Republican coalition” (p. 1). Still, in maverick-style, populists ruled the debates in 
trying to make it so: “Trump made mincemeat of his Republican opponents by repeating 
Reagan’s promise to make America great again… [while] Sanders …[advocated] the 
policies of the Truman Administration in an accent reminiscent of Woody Allen’s period 
films…” (Goldman, 2016, p. 212).  
What became apparent in this analysis was that all candidates, to varying degrees, 
establishment and anti-establishment alike, regardless of ideological footings, used an 
appeal toward nostalgia throughout the 2016 debates. By targeting the precarious, insecure 
circumstances that electors found themselves in, the populist frame and the use of 
emotional, opened up the construction of nostalgic appeals to connect directly to voters. 
Like collective action frames, nostalgia also assists in identity work, acting as “a powerful 
coping mechanism, helping to maintain identity continuity during times of social upheaval” 
(Murphy, 2009, p. 128). Users of nostalgia work to incorporate sentiments which “[signal] 
general predispositions such as glorification of the past, drawing boundaries with other 
national groups, political contention based on national identity, and transcendence or 
coming to terms with class divisions” (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 18). 
For Trump, nostalgia meant expanding the master frame to include calls to a greater 
sense of what America could be, based on what it once was. In using characteristics of the 
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nationalist frame, many of his opening and closing remarks touted several framing devices 
that implied a patriotic sentiment – “we’re don't anymore” (R01, 196) (Washington Post, 
2015, August 6, p. 7). The implication is of course that ‘we’ used to!  
Sanders used moral reasoning mixed in with nostalgia to motivate voter support. 
He often refers to a disappearing middle class, one that was prosperous 40 years ago. While 
in Flint, Michigan, Sanders tells the audience what their city once was: “Do you know that 
in 1960-Detroit, Michigan was one of the wealthiest cities in America? Flint, Michigan, 
was a prosperous city” (D07, 527-528) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 16). To go 
with his often-used framing device about working longer hours for lower wages, Sanders 
reverts to better days of the past when he said, “new jobs in manufacturing, in some cases 
today, pay 50 percent less than they did 20 years ago” (D07, 534-536) (New York Times, 
2016, March 7, p. 17). And on the issue of healthcare, Sanders offers up history as part of 
his moral reasoning; another appeal to a nostalgic ideal: “Now, the truth is, that Frank 
Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, do you know what they believed in? They believed that 
health care should be available to all of our people” (D04, 426-428, 464-467) (New York 
Times, 2016, January 18, p. 13). 
Ted Cruz’s nostalgic framing consistently went back to the policies of Ronald 
Reagan: “Every time we’ve pursued all three of those (tax, regulatory reform; sound money 
— whether in the 1920s with Calvin Coolidge or the 1960s with JFK or the 1980s with 
Ronald Reagan — the result has been incredible economic growth” (R04, 207-209) (Alter, 
2015, p. 6). 
Hillary Clinton’s nostalgic ideal shows up in the campaign as a nod to her 
husband’s past accomplishments, a time when citizens enjoyed “lowered unemployment 
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and increased manufacturing jobs” (D07, 544-546) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, 
p.17). In response to charges about establishment politics and the deregulation of Wall 
Street, Clinton boasts: 
But if we are going to talk about the ’90s, let’s talk about 23 million new 
jobs, incomes went up for everybody. The median African‑ American 
income went up 33 percent at the end of the ’90s, and we lifted more people 
out of poverty than at any other time in recent history. So we were on the 
right path. More jobs, rising incomes (D07, 1063-1072) (New York Times, 
2016, March 7, p. 33).  
Clinton may word it differently, but she too wanted to make America great again, 
“I don’t think we need to make America great again. America didn’t stop being great; we 
have to make it whole again” (D07, 1424-1426) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 43). 
What was once preserved as a diagnosis, nostalgia, at least in modern times, appears to 
have turned into a non-partisan prognosis – that Americans can do better, because once 
upon a time past, at least for some, they have. Like the work of collective action frames, 
nostalgia also assists in identity work – as “a powerful coping mechanism hoping to 
maintain identity continuity during times of social upheaval” (Murphy, 2009, 128). Having 
all candidates, establishment and otherwise, however, refer to the past for ‘better examples’ 
of what could be, might be more of a sign of the times.  
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CHAPTER VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Niall Ferguson says that populism does not work (Fergusson, 2016). The unfolding 
of American politics in 2016, however, teaches us that it can at least win. David Frum said 
that “this new populism is a lie… a fake.” But the words that populists spoke in 2016 
resonated from the same grievances that were just as true in 2011 as they are today. Much 
like with the use of stereotypes, a populist pulls at the small thread of some truth 
somewhere. Like a social movement, it is not something that happens in a vacuum. 
By presenting themselves as anti-establishment candidates, Sanders and Trump 
rode in on the remnants of the social movements of the Great Recession, which, despite 
their size, had failed to deliver any real solutions; establishment remained stagnant. Unlike 
the social movements of the Great Recession, the opportunity of the 2016 primaries opened 
up the electoral arena and gave populists a chance to challenge establishment at its core. 
Because the mere presence of populism or a growing number of social movements for that 
matter, signal that something has clearly gone wrong, it is only prudent that everyone stop 
and dig deeper. Establishment somewhere has failed. And if greater society fails to help 
correct it, we in essence create the political opportunity for someone else to come along to 
frame their version of what needs to be done. 
Summary of Objectives and Approach 
This paper set out to explore what happens when both establishment and social 
movements fail and how the void to do something about overwhelming grievances creates 
new opportunities for populism to rise up. Specifically, I sought to understand how anti-
establishment candidates used populism to garner support from within the establishment 
arena. By conducting a master frame analysis on the populist and establishment candidates 
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during the 2016 American Presidential Primaries, I was able to unpack the framework of 
all major candidates. This allowed the identification of the top grievances, perpetrators and 
solutions as aired by the primary candidates during the debates, permitting a comparison 
of framing positions between candidate types, but also between political parties.  
In 2016, a hierarchy of grievances emerged, leaving clues to the many growing 
insecurities of the American public. These hierarchies of grievances showed similar themes 
to those of the social movements of the Great Recession (Aslanidis, 2018). Not only were 
some of the grievances the same, but the perpetrators were nearly identical. Matters of 
corruption, uncaring corporations, and growing inequality granted economic insecurity as 
a top grievance. Terrorism (Paris bombings, San Bernardino), a rogue Russia and a nuclear 
North Korea, combined with bad foreign policy brought matters of national/international 
insecurity to the top of the list of grievances. A growing insecurity among group identities 
brought rights and discrimination to the top of the list of grievances. The major theme, in 
all findings, therefore, is one of insecurity in general. 
Important Implications of Findings 
The significant discovery that stood out in this research most lies in seeing the 
power that exists in merely naming something. The debates and the frame analysis herein, 
expose the rhetorical weaknesses of establishment candidacies in comparison to the 
charismatic charges of anti-establishment opponents. In nearly every grievance, issue of 
blame, or solution, the anti-establishment candidates led the charge (Appendices E, F, G, 
H).  
The use of emotion and nostalgia with the frequent use of reasoning and framing 
devices played well to the legitimate growing insecurities of an electoral base. Rhetorical 
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performances worked to further intrigue debate moderators which led to more questions 
concerning the grievances and blames named by anti-establishment candidates. Again, 
there is something to naming a grievance and repeating it like a slogan; blaming someone 
or something and then putting minds at ease or at least instilling hope that things can change 
in a very precise way. The solutions of populist candidates were specific, ranging from 
something as concrete as building a wall to a free education paid for by a speculation tax 
on Wall Street. The application of the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing 
tasks was not only used but was repeated over and over again. Their content often set the 
agenda on what was to be debated – in this sense; it was the maverick that was driving the 
agenda from within the establishment electoral arena. As for establishment candidates, they 
had a plan – a “five-point plan” (D03, 1379) (Washington Post, 2015, December 19, p. 38), 
or a “three-point plan” (D04, 1066) (New York Times, 2016, January 18,  p. 32); (D08, 
1372) (New York Times, 2016, March 10, p. 41); blame was abstract and solutions were 
framed as the same. Establishment rhetoric had an un-coolness to it; theirs were 
conversations of right and left, which were no match for the greater urgency of up and 
down. And as the debates heated up, rather than meet the maverick challengers with 
something better, their grievance became about the rhetoric itself. 
The other discovery was in being able to see the grievances and perpetrators of the 
2016 American Presidential Primaries as a continuance of the same from the 2008 financial 
crisis and the subsequent 2011 social movements. The pattern supports the notion that if 
grievances are left unchecked, in combination with some other major change – more job 
loss, a new drug crisis, a new financial crisis, stark changes in demographics and/or 
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population for instance – that new political contentions and opportunities will present 
themselves; and new challengers to the system will show up!  
Being able to see the grievances and perpetrators identified throughout the debates 
in comparison to those identified by Paris Aslanidis (2018) in the social movements of the 
Great Recession – as well as the issues named by voters in 2016 was noteworthy. At the 
close of the American Presidential Primaries (when Trump won the Republican leadership) 
and again at the 2016 national election, the people of the United States chose populism 
over the establishment. The framing worked. What is more, populism showed that winning 
in the United States – that being anti-establishment and working toward authority within 
the electoral arena is possible. The implication is bifurcated between the opening up of 
further political opportunity to populist challengers, or at best, the raising of consciousness 
to establishment powers that grievances must be addressed; that the electoral arena is 
vulnerable. 
The reemergence and success of populism during the 2016 primaries serves as an 
important anecdote for future generations. “This story” Brooks (2016) writes, “is the 
lodestar for cultural renewal and better politics, no matter one’s place on the ideological 
spectrum” (p. 3). It is a story for establishment to ‘catch up’ with the modernizing structures 
that quake beneath the feat of their electorate. The more that we can understand about the 
meaning making and therefore motivational processes in politics, whether done 
subconsciously or consciously on the part of its originator, the more we can find ways of 
building a better consensus toward the resolution of world problems or even in the 
critiquing of bad ideas.  
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Research Limitations / Needed Future Work in the Field 
While limiting the scope to the debates had its advantages, as discussed earlier in 
the methodology section, other considerations could have further enriched the findings of 
this study. Framing contests and important counter frames that took place apart from the 
debates may have influenced the 2016 populist movement but were out of the scope for 
this research design. This study, therefore, misses the opportunity of exploring framing 
contests within political parties – the back and forth between Mitt Romney and Donald 
Trump, for instance. The influence of media framing was also purposely not taken into 
consideration. Additionally, populist frames exercised during the rallies and press 
conferences of 2015/2016 that would have further enriched this study, were excluded. 
Moderator influence was also problematic in this research in that they set the 
agenda in terms of what questions were asked and to whom. In this sense, grievances were 
addressed or brought up only if there was an opportunity to do so. In controlling these 
opportunities, issues may have been brought up as grievances, not necessarily because they 
were high on the framing agenda of candidacies, but because of moderator influence. 
Additionally, questions and themes that occurred in the debates were highly suspectable to 
current events such as the Paris bombing in November of 2015, and the passing of Justice 
Scalia in February 2016.  
Taking on the daunting task of conducting a master frame analysis has been an eye-
opening experience. One of the most significant limitations in this research lies in the 
inconsistencies of methodology and the issue of subjectivity within the field of framing 
analysis itself. There is no shortage of criticism of its manner of practice nor the results of 
its study. And yet an agreed-upon source with a precise methodology mapped out for those 
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who dare in its execution continues to be elusive. Plenty of examples exist that utilize 
specific topics – climate change, for instance, but not one that can translate into a simple 
how-to method across various subject matter. I concur with Nisbet (2010) in that “the 
process of frame analysis is extremely subjective with no one clear consensus on 
methodology” (Nisbet, 2010, p. 45). Nevertheless, the methodology, as outlined by Van 
Gorp (2010) proved useful for this study. 
Will someone be able to reproduce this research according to the methodology set 
out in this design and come up with the same findings? Not necessarily. But they should 
come close –and the proximity of this research’s outcome to the 2016 Pew Research results 
tell me that I am on the right track. The subjectivity, therefore, built into the process of 
frame analysis makes it fickle at its worst, but its utility in excavating patterns and 
effectiveness, makes it hopeful at its best. 
  
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 82 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abedi, A. (2004). Anti-Political-Establishment Parties a Comparative Analysis (Extremism 
and Democracy). London ; New York: Routledge. 
Ahmadian, Azarshahi, & Paulhus. (2017). Explaining Donald Trump via Communication 
Style: Grandiosity, Informality, and Dynamism. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 107, 49-53. 
Aminzade, R., & McAdam, D. (2001). Emotions and Contentious Politics. In Silence and 
Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics(pp. 15-50). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Aminzade, R., Goldstone, J. A., & McAdam, D. (2001). Silence and voice in the study of 
contentious politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Aslanidis, P. (2016). Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective. 
Political Studies, 64(1_suppl), 88-104. 
Aslanidis, P. (2016). Populist Social Movements of the Great Recession. Mobilization, 
21(3), 301-321 
Aslanidis, P. (2018). Measuring populist discourse with semantic text analysis: An 
application on grassroots populist mobilization. Quality & Quantity, 52(3), 1241-
1263. 
Aslanidis, P. (2018). Populism as a Collective Action Master Frame for Transnational 
Mobilization. Sociological Forum, 33(2), 443-464. 
Barr, R. (2009). Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics. Party Politics, 15(1), 
29-48. 
Benford, R., & Snow, D. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview 
and Assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611-639. 
Bloom, K. (2018, January 22). The Freedom Dividend. Retrieved from 
https://www.yang2020.com/policies/the-freedom-dividend/ 
Blotnick, R., & Lears, R. (Writers). (2019, May 1). Knock Down the House[Television 
broadcast]. Netflix. Retrieved from https://www.netflix.com/title/81080637 
Botterill, Hopkins, Sanghera, & Arshad. (2016). Securing Disunion: Young People's 
Nationalism, Identities and (In)Securities in the Campaign for an independent 
Scotland. Political Geography, 55(C), 124-134. 
Brooks, A. (2016). How Trump Filled the Dignity Deficit. Wall Street Journal, p. A.13. 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 83 
Brooks, A. (2017). The dignity deficit: Reclaiming Americans' sense of purpose. Foreign 
Affairs, 96(2), 106-117. 
Brown, & Sovacool. (2017). The Presidential Politics of Climate Discourse: Energy 
Frames, Policy, and Political Tactics from the 2016 Primaries in the United States. 
Energy Policy, 111, 127-136. 
Calhoun, C. (2013) Occupy Wall Street in perspective.(Report). The British Journal of 
Sociology, 64(1), 26-38. 
Calhoun, C. (2013). Occupy Wall Street in perspective. The British Journal of Sociology, 
64(1), 26-38. 
CBC News. (2018, October 25). Trudeau and Rutte are the 'Right Sort’ of Populists, says 
Dutch PM. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cfcBmHrcUbo 
Ceaser, J. (2007). Demagoguery, Statesmanship, and The American Presidency. Critical 
Review, 19(2-3), 257-298. 
Charnock, G., Purcell, T., & Ribera-Fumaz, R. (2012). ¡Indígnate! The 2011 Popular 
Protests and the Limits to Democracy in Spain. Capital & Class, 36(1), 3-11. 
Chokshi, N. (2018, April 24). Trump Voters Driven by Fear of Losing Status, Not 
Economic Anxiety, Study Finds. The New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/us/politics/trump-economic-anxiety.html 
Clendinen, D. (1982, February 28). It's New Politics vs. Old In Vermont As Mayor Strives 
To Oust Alderman. New York Times, p. L24. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/28/us/it-s-new-politics-vs-old-in-vermont-as-
mayor-strives-to-oust-alderman.html?searchResultPosition=5 
Corcoran, P. (1979). Political language and rhetoric. Austin, University of Texas Press. 
Cornfield, M. (2017). Empowering the Party-Crasher: Donald J. Trump, the First 2016 
GOP Presidential Debate, and the Twitter Marketplace for Political Campaigns. 
Journal of Political Marketing, 16(3-4), 212-243. 
Danziger, S. (2013). Evaluating the Effects of the Great Recession. The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 650(1), 6-24. 
Diani, M. (1992). The Concept of Social Movement. The Sociological Review, 40(1), 1–
25 
Dickerson, J., & Dickerson, J. (2013, October 25). Ted Cruz Is the Rarest of Political 
Species-the Populist Egghead. Retrieved from https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2013/10/ted-cruz-is-a-populist-egghead-the-texas-senator-has-elite-
credentials-but-claims-to-be-a-man-of-the-people.html 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 84 
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of 
Communication, 43(4), 51-58. 
Entman, R. M. (2010). Framing Media Power. In Doing News Framing Analysis: 
Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives(pp. 331-355). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Federici, M. (1991). The Challenge of Populism : The Rise of Right-Wing Democratism 
in Postwar America. New York: Praeger. 
Ferguson, N. (2016, September 24). Five ingredients for a populist backlash - Niall 
Ferguson - Zeitgeist 2016. Retrieved from 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pmdxYTyrI-E 
Formisano, R. (2010). Populist Currents in the 2008 Presidential Campaign. Journal of 
Policy History, 22(2), 237-255. 
Fry, R., & Kochhar, R. (2016, May 12). The shrinking middle class in U.S. metropolitan 
areas: 6 key findings. Retrieved from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/05/12/us-middle-class-metros-takeaways/ 
Gammon, E. (2017). Narcissistic Rage and Neoliberal Reproduction. Global Society, 
31(4), 510-530. 
Gamson, W. (1992). Talking politics. Cambridge [England] ; New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gamson, W. A. (1995). Constructing Social Protest. In Social Movements and Culture(pp. 
85-106). Minneapolis, MN. 
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis : An essay on the organization of experience(Harper 
colophon books ; CN 372). New York: Harper & Row. 
Goldman, S. (2016). The Legitimacy of Nostalgia. Perspectives on Political 
Science, 45(4), 211-214. 
Goldstone, J. (2002). Population and security- How demographic change can lead to 
violent conflict. Journal of International Affairs, 56(1), 3-21 
Goldstone, J. A., & McAdam, D. (2001). Contention in Demographic and Life-Course 
Context. In Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics(pp. 195-221). 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Goldstone, J., & Tilly, C. (2001). Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State 
Response in the Dynamics of Contentious Action. In Silence and Voice in the Study 
of Contentious Politics(pp. 179-194). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Grebelsky-Lichtman, T. (2015). The Role of Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Televised 
Political Debates. Journal of Political Marketing, 1-26. 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 85 
Gurr, T. (1968). Urban Disorder: Perspectives from the Comparative Study of Civil 
Strife. The American Behavioral Scientist (pre-1986), 2(4), 50. 
Haidt, J. (2012). The Righteous Mind : Why Good People are Divided by Politics and 
Religion (1st ed.). New York: Pantheon Books. 
Halpin, J., & Cook, M. (2010, April 14). Social Movements and Progressivism. Retrieved 
from 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2010/04/14/7593/soc
ial-movements-and-progressivism/ 
Hanvelt, M. (2012). The Politics of Eloquence : David Hume's Polite Rhetoric. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 
Hogan, J., & Williams, L. (2004). The Rusticity and Religiosity of Huey P. Long. Rhetoric 
& Public Affairs, 7(2), 149-171. 
Huntington, S., & Harvard University. (1968). Center for International Affairs. Political 
order in changing societies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Irwin, N. (2016, June 28). Donald Trump’s Economic Nostalgia. New York Times. 
Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/29/upshot/donald-trumps-
economic-nostalgia.html?searchResultPosition=1 
Islam, M. (2018). Wealth inequality, democracy and economic freedom. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 46(4), 920-935. 
Iyer, R., Graham, J., Koleva, S., Ditto, P., & Haidt, J. (2010). Beyond Identity Politics: 
Moral Psychology and the 2008 Democratic Primary. Analyses of Social Issues and 
Public Policy, 10(1), 293-306. 
Johnston, H. (1995). A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to Cognitive 
Schemata. In Social Movements and Culture(pp. 217-246). Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Jordan, K., Pennebaker, J., Kenkel, Mary Beth, & Conway, Lucian Gideon. (2017). The 
Exception or the Rule: Using Words to Assess Analytic Thinking, Donald Trump, 
and the American Presidency. Translational Issues in Psychological Science, 3(3), 
312-316. 
Judis, J. B. (2017). The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed 
American and European Politics. Columbia Global Reports. 
Kaufmann, E. P. (2018). White shift: Populism, immigration and the future of white 
majorities. London: Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin books. 
Kendall, K. (1981). A Case Study Course on The Presidential Primaries. Communication 
Education, 30(4), 409-414. 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 86 
Kinnvall, C. (2004). Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the 
Search for Ontological Security. Political Psychology, 25(5), 741-767. 
Kitromilides, Y. (2012). The 1929 Crash and the Great Recession of 2008. Challenge, 
55(1), 5-22. 
Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt. (2012). Tracing the Threads: How Five Moral 
Concerns (Especially Purity) Help Explain Culture War Attitudes. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 46(2), 184-194. 
Krinickiene, E. (2009). The Anatomy of Global Financial Crisis. Intelektine Ekonomika, 
(2), Intelektine Ekonomika, 2009, Issue 2. 
Kurtzleben, D. (2017, August 24). Here's How Many Bernie Sanders Supporters Ultimately 
Voted for Trump. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2017/08/24/545812242/1-in-
10-sanders-primary-voters-ended-up-supporting-trump-survey-finds 
Kuypers, J. A. (2010). Framing Analysis from a Rhetorical Perspective. In Doing News 
Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives(pp. 286-311). New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Lubin, J. (2012). The ‘Occupy’ Movement: Emerging Protest Forms and Contested Urban 
Spaces. Berkeley Planning Journal, 25(1), Berkeley Planning Journal, 2012, 
Vol.25(1). 
Marsh, D., & Stoker, G. (2010). Theory and Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mast, J. (2017). Legitimacy Troubles and the Performance of Power in the 2016 US 
Presidential Election. American Journal of Cultural Sociology, 5(3), 460-480. 
McCarthy, J. D., Smith, J., & Zald, M. N. (1996). Accessing Public, Media, Electoral, and 
Governmental Agendas. In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements(pp. 
291-311). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
McCarthy, J., & Zald, M. (1977). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial 
Theory. American Journal of Sociology, 82(6), 1212-1241. 
McGirr, L. (2001). Suburban warriors the origins of the new American Right (Politics and 
society in twentieth-century America). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
McLean, P. (2017, November 22). The Presidency of Gerald Ford. Lecture presented in 
University of Windsor, Windsor. 
Middlewood, Erin. (2012). The spark for occupy Wall Street.('Adbusters'). The 
Progressive, 76(3), 32. 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 87 
Munk Debates. (2018, November 2). Munk Debates: The Rise of Populism. Retrieved from 
https://www.munkdebates.com/The-Debates/The-Rise-of-Populism 
Murphy, A. (2009). Longing, Nostalgia, and Golden Age Politics: The American Jeremiad 
and the Power of the Past. Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), 125-141. 
Nisbet, M. C. (2010). Knowledge Into Action: Framing the Debates Over Climate Change 
and Poverty. In Doing News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical 
Perspectives(pp. 43-83). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Oliver, J., Rahn, W., & Bartels, L. (2016). Rise of the Trumpenvolk: Populism in the 2016 
Election. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 667(1), 189-206. 
Oliver, P., Johnston, H., Snow, D., & Benford, R. (2000). What a good idea! Ideology and 
frames in social movement research. Mobilization,5(1), 37-54. 
Page, J., & Duffy, M. (2016). What Does Credibility Look like? Tweets and Walls in U.S. 
Presidential Candidates’ Visual Storytelling. Journal of Political Marketing,1-29. 
Parsons Leigh, J., Gauthier, A., Iversen, R., Luhr, S., & Napolitano, L. (2016). Caught in 
between: Neoliberal rhetoric and middle-income families in Canada and the United 
States. Journal of Family Studies, 1-17. 
Perla, H. (2011). Explaining Public Support for the Use of Military Force: The Impact of 
Reference Point Framing and Prospective Decision Making. International 
Organization, 65(1), 139-167. 
Pew Research Center. (2014, June). Political Polarization in the American Public: How 
Increasing Ideological Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, 
Compromise and Everyday Life(Rep.). Retrieved from 
https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/06/6-12-2014-
Political-Polarization-Release.pdf 
Pew Research Center. (2016, July 07). Economy and terrorism are top issues for voters in 
2016. Retrieved from https://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-
issues-in-2016-election/4_1-2/ 
Pew Research Center. (2016, July 7). 2016 Campaign: Strong Interest, Widespread 
Dissatisfaction. Retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/2016-
campaign-strong-interest-widespread-dissatisfaction/ 
Pew Research Center. (2017, January 12). The World Facing Trump: Public Sees ISIS, 
Cyberattacks, North Korea as Top Threats. Retrieved from http://www.people-
press.org/2017/01/12/the-world-facing-trump-public-sees-isis-cyberattacks-north-
korea-as-top-threats/ 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 88 
Ryan, C., & Gamson, W. (2006). The Art of Reframing Political Debates. Contexts, 5(1), 
13-18. 
Saldin, Robert P. (2011). William McKinley and the rhetorical presidency. (Essay). 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 41(1), 119-134. 
Sánchez, M. (2010). Globalisation and loss of identity. International Forum of 
Psychoanalysis, 19(2), 71-77. 
Sanders, K. (2009). Communicating Politics in the Twenty-First Century. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Schedler, A. (1996). Anti-Political-Establishment Parties. Party Politics, 2(3), 291-312. 
Schoor, C. (2017). In the theater of political style: Touches of populism, Pluralism and 
Elitism in Speeches of Politicians. Discourse & Society, 28(6), 657-676. 
Schroedel, J., Bligh, M., Merolla, J., & Gonzalez, R. (2013). Charismatic Rhetoric in the 
2008 Presidential Campaign: Commonalities and Differences. Presidential Studies 
Quarterly, 43(1), 101-128. 
Scruggs, & Benegal. (2012). Declining Public Concern About Climate Change: Can We 
Blame the Great Recession? Global Environmental Change, 22(2), 505-515. 
Seelye, K. Q. (2018, January 21). How a 'Perfect Storm' in New Hampshire Has Fueled an 
Opioid Crisis. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/21/us/new-
hampshire-opioids-epidemic.html?searchResultPosition=1 
Serazio, M. (2016). Encoding the Paranoid Style in American Politics: “Anti-
Establishment” Discourse and Power in Contemporary Spin. Critical Studies in 
Media Communication, 33(2), 181-194. 
Shogan, C., & Warber, A. (2007). The Moral Rhetoric of American Presidents. Political 
Science Quarterly, 122(3), 496. 
Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions : A comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia, and China. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Skocpol, T. (2016). A Tale of Two Insurgencies. The American Interest,12(2), 1-12. 
Snow, D. A., & Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant 
Mobilization. Int. Soc. Mov. Res.,1, 197-218. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285098685_Ideology_Frame_Resonanc
e_and_Participant_Mobilization. 
Solotaroff, P. (2015). Trump seriously. Rolling Stone, (1244), 42. 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 89 
Tarrow, S. (2013). The language of contention : Revolutions in words, 1688-
2012(Cambridge studies in contentious politics). 
Tilly, C. (1973). Does Modernization Breed Revolution? Comparative Politics,5(3), 425-
447. 
Türk, H. (2018). ‘Populism as a medium of mass mobilization’: The case of Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan. International Area Studies Review,21(2), 150-168. 
Van der Zwan, N. (2014). Making sense of financialization. Socio-Economic 
Review, 12(1), 99-129. 
Van Gorp, B. (2010). Strategies to Take Subjectivity Out of Framing Analysis. In Doing 
News Framing Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives(pp. 84-109). New 
York, NY: Routledge. 
Wallace-Wells, B. (2018, June 28). Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and the Legacy of the Bernie 
Sanders Movement. Retrieved from https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-and-the-legacy-of-the-bernie-sanders-movement 
Weigel, D., & Fahrenthold, D. A. (2015, October 17). What is a democratic socialist? 
Bernie Sanders tries to redefine the name. New York Times. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/what-is-a-democratic-socialist-bernie-
sanders-tries-to-redefine-the-name/2015/10/17/d722ba80-7370-11e5-9cbb-
790369643cf9_story.html?utm_term=.10cf7b360193 
Windt, T. (1990). Presidents and Protesters : Political rhetoric in the 1960s (Studies in 
rhetoric and communication). Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 
Wood, L., Kroger, Rolf O, & Sage Publications. (2000). Doing discourse analysis : 
Methods for studying action in talk and text. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications. 
  
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 90 
CITED TRANSCRIPTS 
The Democratic National Convention, 2016 
(D01) Washington Post. (2015, October 13). The CNN Democratic debate transcript, 
annotated. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2015/10/13/the-oct-13-democratic-debate-who-said-what-and-what-it-
means/?utm_term=.a98b9963e858 
(D02) Washington Post. (2015, November 15). The CBS Democratic debate 
transcript, annotated. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/14/the-cbs-
democratic-debate-transcript-with-insight-from-the-
fix/?utm_term=.5089edb7d710 
(D03) Washington Post. (2015, December 19). 3rd Democratic debate transcript, 
annotated: Who said what and what it meant. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/19/3rd-
democratic-debate-transcript-annotated-who-said-what-and-what-it-
meant/?utm_term=.4f2c66235f91 
(D04) New York Times. (2016, January 18). Transcript of the Democratic 
Presidential Debate. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/18/us/politics/transcript-of-the-democratic-
presidential-debate.html 
(D05) New York Times. (2016, February 05). Transcript of the Democratic 
Presidential Debate. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/us/politics/transcript-of-the-democratic-
presidential-debate.html 
(D06) New York Times. (2016, February 12). Transcript of the Democratic 
Presidential Debate in Milwaukee. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/us/politics/transcript-of-the-democratic-
presidential-debate-in-milwaukee.html 
(D07) New York Times. (2016, March 07). Transcript of the Democratic 
Presidential Debate in Flint, Mich. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/07/us/politics/transcript-democratic-
presidential-debate.html 
(D08) New York Times. (2016, March 10). Transcript of the Democratic 
Presidential Debate in Miami. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/us/politics/transcript-democratic-
presidential-debate.html 
(D09) New York Times. (2016, April 15). Transcript: Democratic Presidential 
Debate in Brooklyn. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/us/politics/transcript-democratic-
presidential-debate.html  
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 91 
The Republican National Convention, 2016 
(R01) Washington Post. (2015, August 06). Annotated transcript: The Aug. 6 GOP 
debate. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2015/08/06/annotated-transcript-the-aug-6-gop-
debate/?utm_term=.182bac74bcbe 
(R02) Washington Post. (2015, September 16). Wednesday's GOP debate transcript, 
annotated. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2015/09/16/annotated-transcript-september-16-gop-
debate/?utm_term=.67756c6d56ac 
(R03) Washington Post. (2015, October 28). The third Republican debate transcript, 
annotated. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2015/10/28/the-third-republican-debate-annotating-the-
transcript/?utm_term=.afb12acf8100 
(R04) Alter, C. (2015, November 11). Republican Debate: Read Transcript of Fox 
Business Debate. Retrieved from http://time.com/4107636/transcript-read-
the-full-text-of-the-fourth-republican-debate-in-milwaukee/ 
(R05) Washington Post. (2015, December 15). 5th Republican debate transcript, 
annotated: Who said what and what it meant. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/15/who-said-what-
and-what-it-meant-the-fifth-gop-debate-annotated/?utm_term=.a23e3d632363 
(R06) Washington Post. (2016, January 14). 6th Republican debate transcript, 
annotated: Who said what and what it meant. Retrieved from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/01/14/6th-republican-
debate-transcript-annotated-who-said-what-and-what-it-
meant/?utm_term=.4f29dd75dcaa 
(R08) New York Times. (2016, February 07). Transcript of the Republican 
Presidential Debate. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/us/politics/transcript-of-the-republican-
presidential-debate-in-new-hampshire.html 
(R09) New York Times. (2016, February 14). Transcript of the Republican 
Presidential Debate. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/politics/transcript-of-the-republican-
presidential-debate.html 
(R010) New York Times. (2016, February 26). Transcript of the Republican 
Presidential Debate in Houston. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/us/politics/transcript-of-the-republican-
presidential-debate-in-houston.html 
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 92 
(R011) New York Times. (2016, March 04). Transcript of the Republican Presidential 
Debate in Detroit. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/us/politics/transcript-of-the-republican-
presidential-debate-in-detroit.html 
(R012) New York Times. (2016, March 11). Transcript of the Republican Presidential 
Debate in Florida. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/us/politics/transcript-of-the-republican-
presidential-debate-in-florida.html 
 
  
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
  
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 94 
Appendix A. 2016 Democratic National Convention Debate Schedule  
20
16
 D
N
C 
D
eb
at
es
 - 
Fu
ll 
20
16
 P
ri
m
ar
ie
s 
D
eb
at
e 
Sc
he
du
le
N
O
.
D
a
te
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
B
ro
a
d
ca
st
M
ed
ia
 H
o
st
M
o
d
er
at
o
rs
V
id
eo
 L
in
k
 t
o 
F
u
ll 
D
eb
a
te
O
ri
g
in
a
l T
ra
n
sc
ri
p
t 
L
in
k
1
13
-O
ct
-2
01
5
W
y
nn
 L
as
 V
eg
as
, L
as
 V
eg
as
, 
N
V
C
N
N
/F
ac
eb
oo
k
A
nd
er
so
n 
C
oo
pe
r
Ju
an
 C
ar
lo
s 
L
op
ez
D
an
a 
B
as
h
D
on
 L
em
on
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.y
ou
tu
be
.c
om
/w
at
ch
?v
=
l0
M
8
P
24
A
G
cY
&
li
st
=
P
L
h
oh
P
P
R
ys
ee
2
G
V
V
m
o
G
F
T
A
x
fL
pZ
M
gB
Y
0
hc
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.w
as
hi
ng
to
n
po
st
.c
om
/n
ew
s/
th
e-
fi
x/
w
p/
20
15
/1
0
/1
3/
th
e-
oc
t-
13
-d
em
oc
ra
ti
c-
de
b
at
e-
w
ho
-s
ai
d-
w
ha
t-
an
d-
w
ha
t-
it
-
m
ea
ns
/?
ut
m
_t
er
m
=
.a
98
b
99
6
3e
85
8
2
14
-N
ov
-2
0
15
D
ra
ke
 U
n
iv
er
si
ty
, D
es
 M
oi
n
es
, 
IA
C
B
S
 N
ew
s/
K
C
C
I/
T
he
 D
es
 M
oi
ne
s 
R
eg
is
te
r
Jo
hn
 D
ic
ke
rs
on
N
an
cy
 C
or
de
s
K
ev
in
 C
oo
ne
y
D
es
 M
oi
ne
s 
R
eg
is
te
r's
 
K
at
hi
e 
O
br
ad
ov
ic
h
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.y
ou
tu
be
.c
om
/p
la
yl
is
t?
li
st
=
P
L
eA
h
y4
T
E
2-
hX
vp
kc
6s
3
H
C
F
C
jm
4q
F
pn
Z
F
h
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.w
as
hi
ng
to
n
po
st
.c
om
/n
ew
s/
th
e-
fi
x/
w
p/
20
15
/1
1
/1
4/
th
e-
cb
s-
d
em
oc
ra
ti
c-
d
eb
at
e-
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-w
it
h-
in
si
gh
t-
fr
om
-t
h
e-
fi
x/
?u
tm
_
te
rm
=
.5
0
89
ed
b
7d
7
10
3
19
-D
ec
-2
01
5
S
t. 
A
n
se
lm
 C
ol
le
ge
, G
of
fs
to
w
n,
 
N
H
A
B
C
 N
ew
s
M
ar
th
a 
R
ad
da
tz
D
av
id
 M
ui
r
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.y
ou
tu
be
.c
om
/w
at
ch
?v
=
JD
qZ
I
gc
S
Y
tI
&
li
st
=
P
L
ho
hP
P
R
y
se
e2
G
V
V
m
oG
F
T
A
xf
L
p
Z
M
gB
Y
0h
c&
in
de
x=
2
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.w
as
hi
ng
to
n
po
st
.c
om
/n
ew
s/
th
e-
fi
x/
w
p/
20
15
/1
2
/1
9/
3r
d
-d
em
oc
ra
ti
c-
d
eb
at
e-
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-a
nn
ot
at
ed
-w
h
o-
sa
id
-w
ha
t-
an
d-
w
ha
t-
it
-
m
ea
nt
/?
ut
m
_t
er
m
=
.4
f2
c6
6
23
5
f9
1
4
17
-J
an
-2
01
6
G
ai
lla
rd
 C
en
te
r,
 C
ha
rl
es
to
n,
 S
C
N
B
C
 
N
ew
s/
Y
ou
T
ub
e/
C
on
gr
es
s
io
na
l 
/ B
la
ck
 C
au
cu
s 
In
st
itu
te
L
es
te
r 
H
ol
t
A
nd
re
a 
M
itc
h
el
l
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.y
ou
tu
be
.c
om
/w
at
ch
?v
=
ti
2N
o
ko
q1
J4
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.n
y
ti
m
es
.c
om
/2
01
6/
0
1/
18
/u
s/
p
ol
it
ic
s/
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-o
f-
th
e-
d
em
oc
ra
ti
c-
pr
es
id
en
ti
al
-
de
ba
te
.h
tm
l
5
4-
F
eb
-2
01
6
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
N
ew
 H
am
ps
hi
re
, 
D
ur
ha
m
, N
H
M
S
N
B
C
C
hu
ck
 T
od
d
R
ac
he
l M
ad
do
w
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.y
ou
tu
be
.c
om
/w
at
ch
?v
=
7
jK
2
eI
pj
6-
c
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.n
y
ti
m
es
.c
om
/2
01
6/
0
2/
05
/u
s/
p
ol
it
ic
s/
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-o
f-
th
e-
d
em
oc
ra
ti
c-
pr
es
id
en
ti
al
-
de
ba
te
.h
tm
l
6
11
-F
eb
-2
01
6
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f 
W
is
co
ns
in
–M
ilw
au
ke
e,
 M
ilw
au
ke
e,
 
W
I
P
B
S
/W
E
T
A
-
T
V
/F
ac
eb
oo
k
Ju
dy
 W
oo
dr
uf
f,
 
G
w
en
 I
fi
ll
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.y
ou
tu
be
.c
om
/w
at
ch
?v
=
o
56
p
L
qP
Y
cE
o&
li
st
=
P
L
h
oh
P
P
R
ys
ee
2
G
V
V
m
oG
F
T
A
x
fL
p
Z
M
gB
Y
0
hc
&
in
d
ex
=
3
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.n
y
ti
m
es
.c
om
/2
01
6/
0
2/
12
/u
s/
p
ol
it
ic
s/
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-o
f-
th
e-
d
em
oc
ra
ti
c-
pr
es
id
en
ti
al
-d
eb
at
e-
in
-m
il
w
au
k
ee
.h
tm
l
7
6-
M
ar
-2
01
6
T
he
 W
hi
ti
ng
 in
 F
lin
t C
ul
tu
ra
l 
C
en
te
r,
 F
lin
t, 
M
I
C
N
N
A
nd
er
so
n 
C
oo
pe
r
D
on
 L
em
on
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.y
ou
tu
be
.c
om
/w
at
ch
?v
=
G
3
E
J7
H
X
V
H
H
Q
&
li
st
=
P
L
ho
hP
P
R
ys
ee
2
G
V
V
m
o
G
F
T
A
x
fL
pZ
M
gB
Y
0
hc
&
in
d
ex
=
4
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.n
y
ti
m
es
.c
om
/2
01
6/
0
3/
07
/u
s/
p
ol
it
ic
s/
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-d
em
o
cr
at
ic
-p
re
si
de
nt
ia
l-
de
ba
te
.h
tm
l
8
9-
M
ar
-2
01
6
M
ia
m
i D
ad
e 
C
o
lle
ge
, M
ia
m
i, 
F
L
U
ni
vi
si
on
/T
he
 
W
as
hi
ng
to
n 
P
os
t/C
N
N
Jo
rg
e 
R
am
os
M
ar
ia
 E
le
na
 S
al
in
as
K
ar
en
 T
um
ul
ty
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.y
ou
tu
be
.c
om
/w
at
ch
?v
=
O
q
gT
F
A
1H
nU
M
&
li
st
=
P
L
ho
h
P
P
R
ys
ee
2G
V
V
m
oG
F
T
A
xf
L
pZ
M
g
B
Y
0h
c&
in
de
x
=
5
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.n
y
ti
m
es
.c
om
/2
01
6/
0
3/
10
/u
s/
p
ol
it
ic
s/
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-d
em
o
cr
at
ic
-p
re
si
de
nt
ia
l-
de
ba
te
.h
tm
l
9
14
-A
pr
-2
01
6
D
ug
ga
l G
re
en
ho
us
e 
in
 B
ro
ok
ly
n 
N
av
y 
Y
ar
d,
 B
ro
ok
ly
n,
 N
Y
C
N
N
/N
Y
1
W
ol
f 
B
lit
ze
r,
 
D
an
a 
B
as
h,
 a
nd
 
E
rr
ol
 L
ou
is
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.y
ou
tu
be
.c
om
/w
at
ch
?v
=
Y
rF
u
r
U
jv
X
R
U
&
li
st
=
P
L
ho
hP
P
R
y
se
e2
G
V
V
m
oG
F
T
A
x
fL
p
Z
M
gB
Y
0
hc
&
in
d
ex
=
6
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.n
y
ti
m
es
.c
om
/2
01
6/
0
4/
15
/u
s/
p
ol
it
ic
s/
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-d
em
o
cr
at
ic
-p
re
si
de
nt
ia
l-
de
ba
te
.h
tm
l
1
0
1-
M
ay
-2
01
6
S
an
 F
ra
nc
is
co
, C
al
if
or
ni
a 
(c
an
ce
le
d)
F
ox
 N
ew
s 
C
ha
nn
el
C
A
N
C
E
L
E
D
C
A
N
C
E
L
E
D
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 95 
Appendix B. 2016 Republican National Convention Debate Schedule 
  
20
16
 R
N
C 
D
eb
at
es
 - 
Fu
ll 
20
16
 P
ri
m
ar
ie
s 
D
eb
at
e 
Sc
he
du
le
N
O
.
D
a
te
L
o
ca
ti
o
n
 o
f 
B
ro
a
d
ca
st
M
ed
ia
 H
o
st
M
o
d
er
a
to
rs
V
id
eo
 L
in
k
 t
o
 F
u
ll
 D
eb
a
te
O
ri
g
in
al
 T
ra
n
sc
ri
p
t 
L
in
k
1
6
-A
u
g-
2
0
15
Q
u
ic
k
en
 L
o
an
s 
A
re
n
a,
 
C
le
v
el
an
d,
 O
H
F
ox
 N
ew
s/
 F
ac
eb
oo
k
M
eg
yn
 K
el
ly
B
re
tt
 B
ai
er
C
hr
is
 W
al
la
ce
ht
tp
s:
//
yo
ut
u.
be
/2
rU
4W
3y
fd
58
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.w
as
hi
ng
to
np
os
t.
co
m
/n
ew
s/
p
os
t-
po
li
ti
cs
/w
p/
20
15
/0
8/
06
/a
nn
ot
at
ed
-
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-t
he
-a
ug
-6
-g
op
-
de
ba
te
/?
ut
m
_t
er
m
=
.1
82
ba
c7
4b
cb
e
2
1
6-
S
ep
-2
01
5
A
ir
 F
or
ce
 O
n
e 
P
av
il
io
n
 
o
f 
th
e 
R
on
al
d
 R
ea
g
an
 
P
re
si
d
en
tia
l L
ib
ra
ry
, 
S
im
i 
V
al
le
y
, C
A
C
N
N
/ 
S
al
em
 R
ad
io
Ja
ke
 T
ap
p
er
, 
H
u
gh
 H
ew
itt
, 
D
an
a 
B
as
h
ht
tp
s:
//
yo
ut
u.
be
/o
u0
Q
m
cd
fn
04
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.w
as
hi
ng
to
np
os
t.
co
m
/n
ew
s/
th
e-
fi
x/
w
p/
20
15
/0
9/
16
/a
nn
ot
at
ed
-t
ra
ns
cr
ip
t-
se
pt
em
be
r-
16
-g
op
-
de
ba
te
/?
ut
m
_t
er
m
=
.6
77
56
c6
d5
6a
c
3
2
8-
O
ct
-2
01
5
C
o
or
s 
E
v
en
ts
 C
tr
., 
B
o
ul
d
er
, C
O
C
N
B
C
/ 
W
es
tw
o
o
d 
O
ne
C
ar
l 
Q
u
in
ta
n
ill
a
Jo
hn
 H
ar
w
oo
d
B
ec
ky
 Q
u
ic
k
ht
tp
s:
//
yo
ut
u.
be
/w
pC
O
lo
V
3D
Z
k
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.w
as
hi
ng
to
np
os
t.
co
m
/n
ew
s/
th
e-
fi
x/
w
p/
20
15
/1
0/
28
/t
he
-t
hi
rd
-r
ep
ub
li
ca
n-
de
ba
te
-a
nn
ot
at
in
g-
th
e-
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
/?
ut
m
_t
er
m
=
.a
fb
12
ac
f8
10
0
4
1
0-
N
ov
-2
01
5
M
ilw
au
ke
e 
T
h
ea
tr
e,
 
M
ilw
au
ke
e,
 W
I
F
ox
 B
us
in
es
s/
 W
S
J
N
ei
l 
C
av
u
to
,
M
ar
ia
 B
ar
tir
om
o,
G
er
ar
d
 B
ak
er
ht
tp
s:
//
yo
ut
u.
be
/g
L
U
xX
ia
P
6L
Q
ht
tp
:/
/t
im
e.
co
m
/4
10
76
36
/t
ra
ns
cr
ip
t-
re
ad
-
th
e-
fu
ll
-t
ex
t-
of
-t
he
-f
ou
rt
h-
re
pu
bl
ic
an
-
de
ba
te
-i
n-
m
il
w
au
ke
e/
5
1
5-
D
ec
-2
0
15
T
he
 V
en
et
ia
n,
 L
as
 
V
eg
as
, N
V
C
N
N
/ 
S
al
em
 R
ad
io
W
ol
f 
B
li
tz
er
ht
tp
s:
//
yo
ut
u.
be
/Y
H
Y
k0
K
7i
sz
o
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.w
as
hi
ng
to
np
os
t.
co
m
/n
ew
s/
th
e-
fi
x/
w
p/
20
15
/1
2/
15
/w
ho
-s
ai
d-
w
ha
t-
an
d-
w
ha
t-
it
-m
ea
nt
-t
he
-f
if
th
-g
op
-d
eb
at
e-
an
no
ta
te
d/
?u
tm
_t
er
m
=
.a
23
e3
d6
32
36
3
6
1
4-
Ja
n
-2
0
16
N
. 
C
h
ar
le
st
o
n 
C
ol
is
eu
m
, 
N
. 
C
h
ar
le
st
o
n,
 S
C
F
ox
 B
us
in
es
s/
 
F
ac
eb
o
ok
N
ei
l 
C
av
u
to
M
ar
ia
 B
ar
tir
om
o 
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.y
ou
tu
be
.c
om
/w
at
ch
?v
=
eT
o2
X
4e
G
8c
Y
&
li
st
=
P
L
m
nV
W
R
5T
9_
di
8n
F
S
m
H
p_
W
-d
IU
l3
_T
Z
X
C
1
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.w
as
hi
ng
to
np
os
t.
co
m
/n
ew
s/
th
e-
fi
x/
w
p/
20
16
/0
1/
14
/6
th
-r
ep
ub
li
ca
n-
de
ba
te
-
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-a
nn
ot
at
ed
-w
ho
-s
ai
d-
w
ha
t-
an
d-
w
ha
t-
it
-m
ea
nt
/?
ut
m
_t
er
m
=
.4
f2
9d
d7
5d
ca
a
7
2
8-
Ja
n
-2
0
16
Io
w
a 
E
ve
nt
s 
C
en
te
r,
 D
es
 
M
oi
n
es
, 
IA
F
ox
 N
ew
s/
 G
oo
gl
e
B
re
t 
B
ai
er
C
hr
is
 W
al
la
ce
M
eg
yn
 K
el
ly
E
xc
lu
de
d 
fr
om
 s
tu
dy
 (
T
ru
m
p 
ab
se
nt
 f
ro
m
 
de
ba
te
)
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.w
as
hi
ng
to
np
os
t.
co
m
/n
ew
s/
th
e-
fi
x/
w
p/
20
16
/0
1/
28
/7
th
-r
ep
ub
li
ca
n-
de
ba
te
-
tr
an
sc
ri
pt
-a
nn
ot
at
ed
-w
ho
-s
ai
d-
w
ha
t-
an
d-
w
ha
t-
it
-m
ea
nt
/?
ut
m
_t
er
m
=
.d
08
44
59
30
fe
8
8
6
-F
eb
-2
01
6
S
t. 
A
ns
el
m
 C
ol
le
g
e,
 
G
o
ff
st
o
w
n
, N
H
A
B
C
 N
ew
s/
 
IJ
R
ev
ie
w
.c
om
M
ar
th
a 
R
ad
da
tz
 
D
av
id
 M
ui
r
Jo
sh
 M
cE
lv
ee
n
M
ar
y
 K
at
h
er
in
e 
H
am
ht
tp
s:
//
ab
cn
ew
s.
go
.c
om
/P
ol
it
ic
s/
vi
de
o/
re
pu
bl
ic
an
-p
re
si
de
nt
ia
l-
de
ba
te
-3
67
68
76
0
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.n
yt
im
es
.c
om
/2
01
6/
02
/0
7/
us
/
po
li
ti
cs
/t
ra
ns
cr
ip
t-
of
-t
he
-r
ep
ub
li
ca
n-
pr
es
id
en
ti
al
-d
eb
at
e-
in
-n
ew
-h
am
ps
hi
re
.h
tm
l
9
1
3-
F
eb
-2
01
6
P
ea
ce
 C
en
te
r,
 G
re
en
v
ill
e,
 
S
C
C
B
S
 N
ew
s
Jo
hn
 D
ic
ke
rs
on
ht
tp
s:
//
yo
ut
u.
be
/U
n3
O
hY
s-
tC
E
ht
tp
s:
//
w
w
w
.n
yt
im
es
.c
om
/2
01
6/
02
/1
4/
us
/
po
li
ti
cs
/t
ra
ns
cr
ip
t-
of
-t
he
-r
ep
ub
li
ca
n-
pr
es
id
en
ti
al
-d
eb
at
e.
ht
m
l
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 96 
Continued. 
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Appendix C. Top Grievances for 2016 Anti-Establishment Candidates 
 
Figure 3. Top Grievances: Anti-Establishment, 2016 American Primaries 
 
Figure 4. Top Grievances: Bernie Sanders, 2016  
 
Figure 5. Top Grievances: Donald Trump, 2016 
 
Figure 6. Top Grievances: Ted Cruz, 2016 
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Appendix D. Top Grievances: 2016 Establishment Candidates 
 
Figure 7. Top Grievances: Establishment, 2016 American Primaries 
 
Figure 8. Top Grievances: Hillary Clinton, 2016 
 
Figure 9. Top Grievances: Jeb Bush, 2016  
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Appendix E. Economic Grievances: Breakdown 
 
Figure 10. Economic Grievances, Combined 
 
Grievance: 2008 Financial Crisis 
 
Grievance: Economy, Economic System 
 
Grievance: Unemployment / Under-
Employment 
 
Grievance: Trade and Related Job Loss 
 
Grievance: Lower, Stagnant Wages 
 
  
41.1%
16.7%
6.3%
21.5%
14.4%
Sanders Clinton Bush Trump Cruz
All Economy
(Includes Grievances of 
Unemployment, Trade, Jobs, 
Low, Stagnant Wages)
48.7%
41.0%
2.6% 2.6% 5.1%
Sanders Clinton Bush Trump Cruz
Reference to the 2008 
Financial Crisis
32.4%
18.6%
10.8%
21.6%
16.7%
Sanders Clinton Bush Trump Cruz
Economy / Economic System
53.1%
6.3% 9.4% 3.1%
28.1%
Sanders Clinton Bush Trump Cruz
Unemployment / Under-
Employment
31.5%
6.8%
2.7%
45.2%
13.7%
Sanders Clinton Bush Trump Cruz
Trade and Related Jobs / Job 
Loss
82.6%
13.0% 0.0%
4.3% 0.0%
Sanders Clinton Bush Trump Cruz
Lower, Stagnant Wages
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail  
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries 
©2019, Nancy Duffy 100 
Appendix F. National / International Security Grievances: Breakdown 
 
Figure 11. Security Grievances, Combined 
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Appendix G. Remaining Grievances 
 
Figure 12. Corruption and Establishment Politics 
 
Rights and Discrimination: Breakdown 
 
Figure 13. Grievance: Rights and Discrimination, Combined 
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Remaining Grievances (Continued) 
 
Figure 14. Grievance: Healthcare 
 
Figure 15. Grievance: Immigration 
 
Figure 16. Grievance: Division and 
Rhetorical Choice 
 
Figure 17. Grievance: Infrastructure 
 
Figure 18. Grievance: Education 
 
Figure 19. Grievance: Gun Legislation 
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Remaining Grievances (Continued) 
 
 
Figure 20. Grievance: Climate Change 
 
Figure 21. Grievance: Social Security 
 
Figure 22. Grievance: Addiction / Opioid 
Crisis 
 
Figure 23. Grievance: Supreme Court 
 
Figure 24. Democratic Participation 
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Appendix H. Perpetrators 
 
Figure 25. Perpetrators 
(Note for sake of space, the names along the x-axis for the remaining charts of  
Appendix H are uniform and in this order: Sanders, Clinton, Bush, Trump, Cruz). 
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Perpetrators (Continued) 
 
Figure 30. Government / 
Establishment 
Figure 31. Rigged / Poor 
Economy 
Figure 32. Immigration 
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Appendix I. Grievances and Pew Research Poll Comparison 
  
 
Source of Pew Research Data:  
Pew Research Center. (2016, July 07). Economy and terrorism are top issues for voters in 
2016. Retrieved from https://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-
2016-election/4_1-2/ 
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Appendix J. 
A Congruence between Up and Down Politics, Populism, and Structural Insecurity 
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Appendix K. Framing of the Great Recession Movements  
(A reference to the 2018 Paris Aslanidis Study) 
The following two tables are reprinted from: Populism as a Collective Action Master 
Frame for Transnational Mobilization. Sociological Forum, 33(2), 443-464, with the 
expressed written permission of its author, Paris Aslanidis. 
 
 
 
 
Source: 
Aslanidis, P. (2018). Populism as a Collective Action Master Frame for Transnational 
Mobilization. Sociological Forum, 33(2), 443-464.  
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